Uganda:Demonstrations over age limit bill.

Museveni, Democracy or Dictatorship.

Police in Uganda have arrested several  people including an opposition leader, for demonstrating against a plan to amend the constitution and scrap the presidential age limit.

Norbert Mao, leader of the Democratic Party, was arrested alongside his supporters as they protested against the planned constitutional amendment.

For days now, a clique of legislators from the ruling party, National Resistance Movement, (NRM), has been clandestinely agitating for the removal of the age limit which would give a leeway for the incumbent President Yoweri Museveni to run for another term in 2021.

According to the constitution, anyone above the age of 75 is not eligible to run for the presidency. This means that Museveni who is 73 years old and has been in power since 1986 will be 77 years at the next election, and , therefore not eligible to run again.

Daniel Ruhweza, a professor of constitutional law at Makerere University said that amending the constitution to remove the age limit will be catastrophic.

"The writers of the constitution had a reason why they discussed it before we even debate whether or not we should remove it," he told DW. "I think it will be prudent for us to test whether the reasons for which they placed it in our constitution are justifiable reasons. Ours is a young democracy and indeed the debates around constitutionalism need a mature democracy."

Livingston Sewanyana, Executive Director of the Foundation for Human Rights Initiative also told DW that, "for us it [age limit] is an important safeguard considering the fragility of the Ugandan state."

However, President Yoweri Museveni has distanced himself from those agitating for constitutional amendments to lift the age limit as mere idlers.

"Part of the rumour is that there is a debate about age limit; what are you debating? Which proposal are you debating or talking about? Where is the proposal?" Museveni queried in a meeting with reporters.

However, opposition groups have described Museveni's denial of the whole plan to remove age limits as a ploy to hoodwink Ugandans and push it through his cadres or members of parliament from his party.

Most recently, James Kakooza, a legislator from the ruling NRM party who is also renowned for having pushed for the removal of the presidential term limits in 2005, has embarked on another political maneuver to push for the removal of presidential age limit.

"I think there was a contradiction in the constitution. If somebody has the ability, then you cannot remove that democracy from the people," Kakooza said.

            Social media and youth against removal of age limit.

The members of the peoples democratic party on the campaign against the age limit bill to be forwarded to parliament.

Social media has been awash with the debate on removing presidential age limit with some youth groups even organizing mock birthday parties for President Museveni. They have also coined a slogan that says, "Age limit is the Limit." On several occasions they have clashed with police while rallying Ugandans on the streets of Kampala to join their campaign against lifting of the age limit.

Although the bill has not yet been tabled in parliament for debate, the speaker of the Ugandan parliament Rebecca Kadaga said that some legislators have been threatened not to amend the constitution.

"Members [parliamentarians] are being targeted, they are receiving threatening messages and I want to assure the country that I have not seen any bill. It is not here but there is anger everywhere," she told parliament.

On the streets of Kampala, the idea of lifting the age limit is not so popular. Jacquelyn Kakunzi told DW that, "our democracy is not stable. In Uganda today where 75 percent of Ugandans are youth and below the age of 35 weare really creating a situation where the youth cannot be leaders."

Opposition leader Kizza Besigye has also raised concerns and denounced the move to lift the age limit. Besigye who has lost to Museveni in the previous four elections has been calling for an uprising and reject the proposals. "The way forward, we recommend that all pro-democracy forces should focus on terminating control of power by the NRM junta," Besigye said.

THIS IS MY CANCER STORY

THE DANGERS FACING REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENTS IN AFRICA

"Many of these governments believe that stability and economic growth “will improve” over time. It seldom does". 

Numerous people have asked me for my thoughts regarding revolutionary governments.

Indeed, Africa has seen numerous governments come to power through revolutions - some relatively peaceful, some very violent. Invariably, the scars of the revolution remain and left unattended can result in an uprising of the populace or even a counter-revolution.

Without exception, every revolutionary government I have come into contact with is already politically and economically fragile with growing security and stability challenges. Without acknowledging their fragility and taking the necessary actions to strengthen the Pillars of State, they find themselves on the road to failure.  

Some of these revolutions have been internally motivated and some inspired and motivated by foreign interests. Regardless of how they came to power, most African revolutionary governments have similar characteristics. Failure to manage these characteristics can result in the government becoming a failed state.

Many of these governments believe that stability and economic growth “will improve” over time. It seldom does.

As these governments tend to be caught up in the moment, they miss the numerous threats and challenges facing them – until it is almost too late.  This failure results in them ultimately being forced to fight several fires on numerous fronts with little if any significant impact.

The lack of substantial visible improvements to their lot is usually viewed by the populace as an inability of the government – or even a lack of interest - to provide them with much needed security and stability.  This is especially prevalent in the early days of a revolutionary government.

It is, however, the characteristics of a revolutionary government that define its initial weaknesses. I view these characteristics and weaknesses as follows:  

1.     An over optimistic view of the future

2.     A belief that the majority of the populace share their visions for the future

3.     A lack of strategic, operational and tactical intelligence

4.     Lack of – or a fractured grand strategy

5.     Lack of – or a fractured national security strategy

6.     Lack of an acceptable Constitution

7.     A weak central government

8.     Fragmented powerbases

9.     Fragmented popular support

10.  Porous borders

11.  A lack of basic services

12.  A breakdown of law and order coupled to an increase in general and organized crime

13.  The uncontrolled flow of weapons

14.  Strong militia groups, each with their own agenda

15.  Disunity of the security forces coupled to questionable loyalty

16.  The polarization of popular support that can result in assassinations, bombings, protests etc.

17.  A lack of cohesion, communication and cooperation between the security forces

18.  An increase in Internally Displaced People (IDPs)

Left unattended, these characteristics/weaknesses will result in an increase in negative media reporting, both locally and internationally as both the mainstream and social media exploit the situation. This negative perception results in a lack of inward investments, depriving the new government of much needed foreign investment and economic growth. This creates a ripple-effect across the population and often results in the populace becoming poorer than they were before the revolution.

Additionally, this creates the climate for a counter-revolution to be planned and launched by disgruntled militia groups and sectors of the previous regimes supporters. The counter-revolution will often manifest itself through acts of terror such as assassinations, bombings, an increase in violent crime, attacks against the leadership of the security forces and threats against the political and business leadership.

This volatile situation “empowers Salesmen to impersonate Statesmen” (credit to “Lionberger”s comment on my posting “The Specialists”) who simply add fuel to the fire as these salesmen- with no track record of success - dispense their bad advice at great financial and political cost to the government.  Equally unforgivable is the selling of security equipment to these governments that will have little if any use to securing the State.

Until revolutionary governments acknowledge and manage/rectify their weaknesses and find the correct people to advise and assist them, they will remain fragile and position themselves on the cusp of failure. 

Uganda:Where beauty means bleaching

"There seems to be a strong desire for browner or fairer skin,Yet at the same time, there is shame and secrecy to it."

 

 Living in Uganda, German photographer Anne Ackermann couldn't ignore the sight of light-skinned women with obviously dark feet, elbows and joints.

As someone who regularly documents issues surrounding beauty, identity and womanhood, Ackermann's natural curiosity led her to Mama Lususu.

Mama Lususu, which translates to the "mother of beautiful skin," owns popular beauty parlors across downtown Kampala and is famous for helping women to bleach and lighten their skin tone. She also helps to repair skin damaged by the improper use of bleaching chemicals or even stain removers at home.

Skin lightening, a common practice in Uganda, is something that few women will admit to even though they were willing to be photographed by Ackermann in Lususu's parlor. Some of Ackermann's subjects even tried to tell her they were born with lighter skin.

 

 

 

"There seems to be a strong desire for browner or fairer skin," Ackermann said. "Yet at the same time, there is shame and secrecy to it."

 

The ideal skin tone in Uganda appears to be caramel, Ackermann said. One client told her "brown women shine brighter in the dark night." Women are willing to apply harsh chemicals and carcinogens to lighten their skin, which surprised Ackermann because the process is also so harmful.

"I am learning that there seems to be a serious pressure for women to fit into dominant beauty stereotypes in a society based on the belief that the fairer and lighter is associated with beauty and wealth," she said.

Besides photographs for her ongoing series, the experience at Lususu's has also afforded Ackermann with new memories and a unique perspective of Kampala.

 

 Photographer Ackermann.

 

 "there seems to be a serious pressure for women to fit into dominant beauty stereotypes in a society based on the belief that the fairer and lighter is associated with beauty and wealth,"

 

 

Besides photographs for her ongoing series, the experience at Lususu's has also afforded Ackermann with new memories and a unique perspective of Kampala.

"Just hanging out around the tiny wooden cabins in Mama Lususu's parlor in the hustle and bustle of downtown Kampala -- the air heavy with chemicals, watching and chatting to the women that showed up there from all walks of life -- was a great experience after trying to gain access for so long," she said.

 

 Ackermann says her project is far from over, and she wants to keep documenting this process while broadening the scope to include other issues of beauty and identity. She has also started another series on beauty and plastic surgery, which is new to the region.

Ackermann has previously documented body and identity issues. Her 2009 series "Plástica" followed women after plastic surgery in Brazil.

She is now on a quest to find other projects that portray surprising and positive stories in Uganda. And she hopes her images will cause people to reflect on the undertones of identity.

"I think it's all about raising a question rather than finding all the answers," she said. "If I can make people pause their everyday routine for a moment, look at the images, stop and wonder, I think that's a lot."

 

 

Israel and Uganda,Refugees-for-arms deal

Despite this week's Ugandan media expose of an under-the-table refugee deportation agreement already challenged in Israel's Supreme Court, Kampala is still in denial. And the deportees, who sought safe haven in the Promised Land, face a bitter fate

 A leading Ugandan newspaper made a splash this week with the front page headline: "Israel sends 1,400 refugees to Uganda". The behind-the-scenes deal between Israel, Uganda and Rwanda has been exposed for some time in Israel, but Uganda officially continues to deny its existence. It’s therefore significant that Sunday Vision, a paper owned by the government, has publicized - and legitimized - the story.

The newspaper reported in its September 10 edition that it had interviewed ten refugees who said Israel had  promised to resettle them in Uganda, only for them to have been abandoned and harassed by state agents in Kampala.

"We were each promised that we would be given legal status once we landed at Entebbe. My other friends opted for Rwanda. Each one of us was given about $3,500, which they told us was an extra incentive at the departure lounge in Tel Aviv," Hebreges Tayes told the newspaper.

Israel and East Africa are thousands of miles apart, with little in common, but history has led to a series of intersections between them.

Around 1903, a slice of East Africa (the so-called "Uganda Plan") surprisingly emerged as a stop-gap homeland for persecuted Jews before present day Israel became the more obvious choice.

Then on July 4, 1976, Israeli Defence Forces' planes refuelled at Jomo Kenyatta Airport in Kenya on their way to Entebbe Airport in Uganda, where a daring raid ended in the rescue of mostly Israeli nationals whose Air France plane had been seized by Palestinian hijackers, backed by eccentric Ugandan dictator Idi Amin.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu marked the 40th anniversary of the rescue when he visited Uganda and Kenya last year; his brother Yonatan,the operation's commander, lost his life in the raid.

But over the last three years or so, Israel's latest rapport with East Africa has raised eyebrows in the region and within the international community. This time, it's certainly not a story of heroism.

The latest intersection concerns an unpublished agreement to facilitate the deportation of African asylum seekers and refugees in Israel to "third countries" – namely, Uganda and Rwanda. Israel's estimated 38,000 asylum seekers are mostly from Eritrea and Sudan. Fleeing repression, they faced rape, torture and blackmail on their trek through the Sinai to Israel's southern border.

Persistent reports suggest that Kampala and Kigali are getting Israeli weapons, military training and other forms of aid in return, but just like their counterparts in Jerusalem, officials in both countries refuse to talk about any quid pro quo refugees-for-arms deal.

However, with NGOs and human rights activists going to court in Israel, which recently ruled that the deportations can go ahead but deportees who resist can't be held in detention for more than two months, the Israeli authorities have owned up more fully.

It took the lifting of a gag order in 2013 to first reveal the agreement in Israel. Rwanda acknowledged it in 2015 including the multi-million dollar monetary compensation involved.

 But no such transparency exists in Uganda, so the government remains adamant there's no such agreement. Since Sunday's Vision expose, there has still not been an official government response.

Indeed, only last week, government spokesman Ofwono Opondo told me point-blank that there are no Eritreans and Sudanese arriving from Israel on Ugandan soil.

"We have cross-checked that information, even with Rwanda and our Immigration Department, we don't have those people," he said. "We don't know why they [Israelis] circulate that information, we don't have an agreement with them and we don't have Eritreans or Sudanese or any other nationality [here] on the basis of an agreement with the Israelis."

Mr Opondo further said that the Ugandan authorities had challenged the Israelis to produce the list of people they have sent to Uganda but got no response.

"Uganda is welcoming to refugees, so why would we hide these ones?" he queried.

Asked about an arms deal as the possible explanation for the secrecy, Mr Opondo retorted, "Do we need to buy arms secretly? We are not under an embargo, and if we want to purchase arms from Israel, it is not under an embargo either."

Of course, the arms business is legendary for its secrecy.

Uganda and Israel have a longstanding relationship based on military procurement, with Netanyahu playing a key role. A Haaretz journalist last year revealed that Netanyahu, while working as finance minister in 2005, visited Uganda with arms manufacturer Silver Shadow Systems. The trip was paid for by the Uganda government to the tune of $57,000.

With both Uganda and Rwanda led by former guerrilla leaders who today boast of two of Africa's most competent armies, it is difficult to see beyond arms as the main factor behind the East African countries' readiness to host Israel's "infiltrators", as its right-wing ministers are wont to call asylum-seekers.

If Uganda, for instance, was taking them in on humanitarian grounds, rather than deny it, government officials would have made it a point to trumpet the gesture and invoke the spirit of pan-Africanism, just as it has done with theone million or so South Sudan refugees in the north of the country.

But with the Sunday Vision expose, which nevertheless incorporates more denial by government officials, there's nowhere to hide any more. According to Sunday Vision, the refugees live in a "stateless limbo" in Kampala while those who get fed up are tempted to make illegal border crossings that expose them to blackmail and abuse at the hands of smugglers and security forces.

Uganda's vehement denial notwithstanding, if Israel and its East African partners had succeeded in keeping this arrangement under wraps, NGOs and human rights groups would not have found the ammunition needed to take to Israel's Supreme Court to challenge it at all. Rights groups argues that, for African refugees in Israel, choosing between detention in Israel, a return to potentially life-threatening Eritrea or relocation to Uganda with $3,500 in hand, is no choice at all.

Therefore, the quiet agreement, contrary to what the Uganda government spokesman claims, is for all intents and purposes an unholy alliance created to deliver mutual benefits.

Israel desperately wants to uproot 38,000 African refugees from its territory and in Uganda and Rwanda it has found governments that will do anything to lay their hands on Israeli arms, hence the vow of secrecy and conspiracy of silence.

Unfortunately, the danger with such a secretive arrangement is that after Israel has achieved its objective and Uganda and Rwanda have got theirweapons, no one really cares about the deportees.

Uganda might have won international acclaim for its generous refugee policy, but that is with regard to well documented refugees arriving from warring neighboring countries who come with low, if any, expectations.

According to a story published by Al Jazeera, the deported individuals have no legal status in Uganda and have to fend for themselves.

The Sunday Vision article adds that some refugees, having failed to settle in Uganda, have attempted to relocate to Europe by way of the treacherous and often fatal boat routes operated by people smugglers across the Mediterranean Sea.

For the young men who braved the torturous Sinai desert trek in search of a better life in the Holy Land, it's been  a rude awakening. But the luckless, desperate deportees won't find their Promised Land in Uganda, either.

WHERE IS EAST AFRICA'S OIL

IS IT POLITICS OR JUST FINANCE THAT'S DELAYING THE DEVELOPMENT OF EAST AFRICA'S OIL 

Delays and disagreements have slowed down the extraction and exportation of new oil discoveries in Kenya and Uganda.

It was not long ago that East Africa was the shining frontier of the continent’s oil scene. Uganda sparked the rush in 2006 after wildcatters ventured deep inland and made Africa’s largest onshore discoveries in decades. And Kenya’s north­western Turkana region continued the run with new oilfields found in 2012.
With crude prices averag­ing almost $112 per barrel at that time, it was hoped these fresh discoveries could be linked up with a new regional pipeline network stretching from South Sudan to the coast. It was believed that oil could economically transform the East African region.
Yet a decade on, little progress has been made on the pipeline, while Uganda and Ken­ya’s oil remains trapped far from interna­tional markets.
Security risks have hindered developments, while the steep drop in crude prices from late-2014 has slowed things down. However, politics – both domestic and regional – have also been central to the delays.

Domestic politics

Uganda

 

         Museveni says he’s “not excited” about Uganda’s oil. Is anyone anymore?

In Uganda, where government estimates suggest reserves of 6.5 billion barrels, a consensus has now been reached to develop an export pipeline by the early-2020s . But this has only come after various disagreements deferred developments.
It took years, for example, for Presi­dent Yoweri Museveni to back down from his original idea of meeting East Africa’s petroleum needs through a large-scale oil refinery. This was widely regarded as an uneco­nomic proposition and a smaller-scale option has now been accepted.
Progress was also stalled by a series of drawn out tax disputes in Ugandan and London courts. However, it was Museveni’s hard bargaining with international oil companies over the terms of production licenses that brought things to a crawl, with the two sides finally reaching an agreement in August 2016.
To his credit, Museveni has provided Uganda with a relatively favourable deal. But it came at the cost of delaying oil production for several years.

Kenya

In Kenya, after much fanfare following its first oil discovery, there have only been mar­ginal exploration gains of late. Estimates of recoverable oil in the South Lokichar Basin of the Turkana region have now risen to 750 million barrels according to operator Tullow.
Nevertheless, low-cost onshore oil continues to draw in big players from the global energy industry. Just this week, the French oil major Total entered the scene after acquiring Maersk Oil and Gas, along with its Kenyan assets. Alongside partners Tullow and Africa Oil, it will look to bring Kenyan oil to international markets.
However, an unhealthy relationship between local and national politicians could present an impedi­ment to production. This was most recently demonstrated in the August 2017 elections. During the campaign, President Uhuru Kenyatta sparred with Turkana governor Joseph Nanok over the president’s refusal to sign a bill that would grant the county a high share of oil revenues.
Turkana been neglected by Nairobi for decades, and local politicians are now wrestling to control new resources brought in by oil develop­ment. This led to a suspension of oper­ations for several weeks in 2013 due to local protect, and again in June this year as locals blocked roads and seized oil company assets.
In Turkana, grievances over a lack of jobs and development will not go away because the election season is over. Kenyatta will need to work towards a compromise with county politicians and local communities if the industry is to make further progress.

South Sudan

Since its separation from Sudan in July 2011, South Sudan’s oil industry has been severely undermined by political interven­tion and armed conflict. Oil production was around 350,000 barrels per day around the time of independence, but only 130,000 barrels per day in early-2017, accord­ing to government officials.
The government has ambitious plans to more than double the current produc­tion rate, but South Sudan needs a significant period of internal stability before oil companies will be willing to take the risk to invest in revitalising its aging oilfields. Without investments in enhanced oil recovery or significant new discoveries, output from South Sudan’s current oilfields will not reach pre-civil war highs again.
The best prospects for new oil are in Jonglei state. But the large, isolated and unstable region is hardly a desirable destination for low-cost, risk-free exploration. Total has been flirting with exploring there for decades. It was recently in fresh talks with the government, along­side partners Tullow Oil and the Kuwait Foreign Petroleum Exploration Company (KUFPEC), but negotia­tions broke down in April.

Regional tensions

Uganda

Beyond ongoing domestic challenges, regional relations have also emerged as a complex challenge. In landlocked Uganda, this has centred on whether to opt for a pipeline to the coast through Kenya – via Turkana’s oil reserves – or through Tanzania.
It was only after years of wrangling with the former that Uganda recently announced construction would soon start on a pipeline through the latter. The plan is that the estimated $3.9 billion, 1,443km pipeline will run from Lake Albert down the western edge of Lake Victoria and to the Tanzanian port at Tanga.
If the decision holds, it means that East Africa may eventually have to construct two separate pipelines. Uganda could have saved the region costs by joining up with Kenya’s pipeline, but it was concerned about security and delays from land disputes in Kenya’s restive north. Kampala was also keen to avoid over-dependence on Nairobi as its dominant trade gateway.
In its bid, Tanzania offered to lower tariffs on the pipeline to competitive rates. It presented a more feasible timetable, fewer land acquisition constraints, and lower security risks.
However, this option will not necessarily be problem free. Over the 30-40 year lifespan of the oil production, politics in both countries will certainly shift, and Tanzania could take advantage of its position as Uganda’s only transit route.
The wildcard in the region’s pipeline politics will be whether Total – given its recent entry into Kenya and majority stakes in Uganda – revives the idea of building a pipeline from Lake Albert to the Kenyan coast, and ditching Tanzania altogether.

 

Kenya

Depending on how this pans out, Kenya may still need to go it alone in building its own pipeline. President Kenyatta says a route from Turkana to Lamu will spur development in the marginalised region and that new economic opportunities will dampen security con­cerns. However, others fear that political elites are looking to further enrich themselves through land grabs in the north.
In any case, the persistence of lower global oil prices means that, in absence of a new deal with Uganda on a regional pipeline, Kenya will likely need to discover more oil if investors are to see financing a Kenya-only pipeline as a fruitful ven­ture.

 

South Sudan

South Sudan may have attained political freedom in 2011, but it is still dependent on a pipeline through Sudan to export oil, the government’s main source of rev­enue.
A deal was struck late last year to extend the arrangement between Juba and Khartoum until the end of 2019. The agreement includes a sliding scale for transit fees, which will help ensure that South Sudan does not run a loss when global prices are low.

 However, the political relationship between the two Sudans is anything but stable, as the short border war in 2012 demonstrated. Khar­toum may attempt to extract new political and economic concessions from South Sudan when the current agreement expires.

       Source: Petroleum Economist.

 

It’s the politics

After years of domestic and regional political wrangling, some progress may be being made in terms of extracting and exporting East African oil. But many disputes are yet to be resolved, while others may still heighten uncertainties.
The undefined and porous borders across Africa, for instance, could lead to further quarrels. Uganda’s exploration on the borer of Lake Albert is already being protested by the Democratic Republic of Congo. Meanwhile, Kenya’s push for maritime exploration in the Indian Ocean is being contested by Somalia.
The implementation of international rulings on disputes elsewhere in Africa – for example, between Nigeria and Cameroon – could set important precedents in solving such border disagreements.
Over a decade on from the initial discoveries, East Africa’s oil is still yet to deliver on its promises. There have been many factors behind the delays, but many have been caused by domestic and regional politics, both of which will continue to be central in determining the success of new growth opportunities.

 A version of this article was originally published in the AFRICAN ARGUMENTS.

RWANDA ELECTIONS,IS IT A FAIR GAME?

"If the Rwandan Patriotic Front is so loved ... why is it that when someone like me decides to run for the presidency, they do all in their power to prevent it?" she asks. "Why are there soldiers all over the place?"

                                                                                             Diane Shima Rwigara.

A former child refugee, Paul Kagame was once a hero to the West, feted for helping to bring Rwanda's bloody genocide to an end.

But with allegations of repression, violence and politically-motivated murder dogging his rule, the military and political leader's international reputation has suffered. Undaunted, the Rwandan leader is standing for re-election on Friday.

Seventeen years into his presidency -- and with the prospect of as many as 17 more to come -- there seems little doubt Kagame will claim victory again come polling day.

"Some people have said that the result of the election is a foregone conclusion. They are not wrong," Kagame said at a rally in Ruhango district, in Rwanda's Southern Province, as the campaign kicked off on July 14.

"Rwandans made their position clear in 2015," he told crowds of supporters, referring to the 2015 referendum in which 98% of voters backed changes to the constitution, allowing him to seek a third, fourth and fifth term in office -- and potentially remain in post until 2034.

life spent in exile

Kagame, who turns 60 this year, had experienced the impact of the Tutsi-Hutu division which threatened to tear his country apart early: he was brought up in exile in neighboring Uganda following an earlier violent uprising in 1959.

Rwanda's then-Vice President Paul Kagame watches a military rally in Kigali on October 1, 1994.

His leadership credentials were forged on the battlefield, first as part of Yoweri Museveni's army which overthrew the regime of Milton Obote in Uganda.

After serving as Museveni's intelligence chief, he led the armed wing of the Rwandan Patriotic Front into Kigali to halt the 1994 genocide, in which almost a million Tutsis were murdered by rival Hutus, and up to two million people fled the country.

Once in power, first as vice president and defense minister, and then from 2000 as president, Kagame -- a Tutsi himself -- pursued those responsible for the genocide across the border into the Democratic Republic of the Congo (then known as Zaire), eliminating many of them.

In the years following the genocide, Rwanda's military clout belied the nation's size, helping to topple Mobutu Sese Seko in the DRC and bring Laurent Kabila to power.

After Kagame fell out with the DRC's new leader, Rwandan troops shifted their allegiance, backing rebels who were trying to overthrow Kabila. They were later accused of plundering the DRC's precious minerals -- a charge the military denied.

Kagame was also accused of arming anti-government militias such as the M23 rebels in eastern DRC. The Rwandan leader denied any involvement.

Three oppositions ruled out of race

Nude photographs purporting to show Diane Shima Rwigara were circulated online after she announced plans to stand in Rwanda's presidential election.

The Rwandan Electoral Commission later ruled that women's rights activist and Kagame critic Rwigara had not collected enough signatures to support her candidacy. It accused her of conspiring to forge voters' signatures, and listing dead people among her backers.

Rwigara says "those are false allegations. The ID numbers released by (the) NEC are different from the ID numbers we submitted to the commission."

"If the Rwandan Patriotic Front is so loved ... why is it that when someone like me decides to run for the presidency, they do all in their power to prevent it?" she asks. "Why are there soldiers all over the place?"

Rwigara says that while Kagame has been good for the country in the past, Rwanda needs a new president to lead the nation into the future.

"After the genocide, the country needed a strong man as a leader to pull the country together," she says. "But that way of leading us is no longer serving us -- on the contrary, it is suffocating us.

Diane Shima Rwigara, 35, had hoped to run for election, but within days of announcing her plans to stand against Kagame, nude photos of her -- which she says were photoshopped -- began to circulate on the internet.

 At home, Kagame is credited with modernizing a nation once at war with itself: the streets are clean, you will see no vagrants, the internet works, plastic bags are banned, and he gives cattle to the poor.

Perhaps most importantly, he has erased the bitterly divisive terms "Hutu" and "Tutsi" -- nowadays, the only accepted identity is "Rwandan."

His supporters also point to the fact that the country has 11 opposition parties, 12 TV stations and 35 radio stations.

Those numbers suggest an atmosphere of plurality and a tolerance of dissenting views, but look again: Nine of the parties have backed Kagame, and many media outlets' coverage of the election campaign has focused solely on the President, offering only his viewpoint.

And while the country boasts the highest proportion of female lawmakers in the world -- 61% of seats in Rwanda's parliament are held by women -- there was no place for a woman on the presidential ballot.

'Peace does not necessaryly mean   democracy'

Rwandan independent candidate Philippe Mpayimana in Shyrongi, north of Kigali on July 29, 2017.

With Rwigara and two other candidates ruled out of the contest by the electoral 

commission, Kagame's only opponents in the race for the presidency are independent Philippe Mpayimana, a former journalist who has spent much of his life in exile in Europe, and Frank Habineza, of the Democratic Green Party.

Habineza believes his party, founded in 2009 is growing fast. He says campaigning against the incumbent has been difficult at times, "some people prevented people from coming to our meeting" early in the campaign.

"We asked for a venue to do our campaign and we were sent to a cemetery -- we had to suspend our campaign because we could not work from a graveyard," he explains.

He says the situation stabilized after the party complained to the Ministry of Local Government and to the police, prompting the local government to take action, issuing a warning to district mayors and local authorities.

Like Rwigara, Habineza concedes that Kagame's rule has had some benefits, but says those are outweighed by the challenges the country still faces.

"One thing we know is that he brought peace and stability to Rwanda, but not democracy," he says. "He failed on democracy and that is my role. He was a former rebel leader, so he has been ruling the country like a soldier."

And that is the dilemma Kagame faces. If -- or, when -- he wins on Friday, he must convince his critics that he knows another way to rule than the one that has caused both his people and his international backers so many concerns.