WHERE IS EAST AFRICA'S OIL

IS IT POLITICS OR JUST FINANCE THAT'S DELAYING THE DEVELOPMENT OF EAST AFRICA'S OIL 

Delays and disagreements have slowed down the extraction and exportation of new oil discoveries in Kenya and Uganda.

It was not long ago that East Africa was the shining frontier of the continent’s oil scene. Uganda sparked the rush in 2006 after wildcatters ventured deep inland and made Africa’s largest onshore discoveries in decades. And Kenya’s north­western Turkana region continued the run with new oilfields found in 2012.
With crude prices averag­ing almost $112 per barrel at that time, it was hoped these fresh discoveries could be linked up with a new regional pipeline network stretching from South Sudan to the coast. It was believed that oil could economically transform the East African region.
Yet a decade on, little progress has been made on the pipeline, while Uganda and Ken­ya’s oil remains trapped far from interna­tional markets.
Security risks have hindered developments, while the steep drop in crude prices from late-2014 has slowed things down. However, politics – both domestic and regional – have also been central to the delays.

Domestic politics

Uganda

 

         Museveni says he’s “not excited” about Uganda’s oil. Is anyone anymore?

In Uganda, where government estimates suggest reserves of 6.5 billion barrels, a consensus has now been reached to develop an export pipeline by the early-2020s . But this has only come after various disagreements deferred developments.
It took years, for example, for Presi­dent Yoweri Museveni to back down from his original idea of meeting East Africa’s petroleum needs through a large-scale oil refinery. This was widely regarded as an uneco­nomic proposition and a smaller-scale option has now been accepted.
Progress was also stalled by a series of drawn out tax disputes in Ugandan and London courts. However, it was Museveni’s hard bargaining with international oil companies over the terms of production licenses that brought things to a crawl, with the two sides finally reaching an agreement in August 2016.
To his credit, Museveni has provided Uganda with a relatively favourable deal. But it came at the cost of delaying oil production for several years.

Kenya

In Kenya, after much fanfare following its first oil discovery, there have only been mar­ginal exploration gains of late. Estimates of recoverable oil in the South Lokichar Basin of the Turkana region have now risen to 750 million barrels according to operator Tullow.
Nevertheless, low-cost onshore oil continues to draw in big players from the global energy industry. Just this week, the French oil major Total entered the scene after acquiring Maersk Oil and Gas, along with its Kenyan assets. Alongside partners Tullow and Africa Oil, it will look to bring Kenyan oil to international markets.
However, an unhealthy relationship between local and national politicians could present an impedi­ment to production. This was most recently demonstrated in the August 2017 elections. During the campaign, President Uhuru Kenyatta sparred with Turkana governor Joseph Nanok over the president’s refusal to sign a bill that would grant the county a high share of oil revenues.
Turkana been neglected by Nairobi for decades, and local politicians are now wrestling to control new resources brought in by oil develop­ment. This led to a suspension of oper­ations for several weeks in 2013 due to local protect, and again in June this year as locals blocked roads and seized oil company assets.
In Turkana, grievances over a lack of jobs and development will not go away because the election season is over. Kenyatta will need to work towards a compromise with county politicians and local communities if the industry is to make further progress.

South Sudan

Since its separation from Sudan in July 2011, South Sudan’s oil industry has been severely undermined by political interven­tion and armed conflict. Oil production was around 350,000 barrels per day around the time of independence, but only 130,000 barrels per day in early-2017, accord­ing to government officials.
The government has ambitious plans to more than double the current produc­tion rate, but South Sudan needs a significant period of internal stability before oil companies will be willing to take the risk to invest in revitalising its aging oilfields. Without investments in enhanced oil recovery or significant new discoveries, output from South Sudan’s current oilfields will not reach pre-civil war highs again.
The best prospects for new oil are in Jonglei state. But the large, isolated and unstable region is hardly a desirable destination for low-cost, risk-free exploration. Total has been flirting with exploring there for decades. It was recently in fresh talks with the government, along­side partners Tullow Oil and the Kuwait Foreign Petroleum Exploration Company (KUFPEC), but negotia­tions broke down in April.

Regional tensions

Uganda

Beyond ongoing domestic challenges, regional relations have also emerged as a complex challenge. In landlocked Uganda, this has centred on whether to opt for a pipeline to the coast through Kenya – via Turkana’s oil reserves – or through Tanzania.
It was only after years of wrangling with the former that Uganda recently announced construction would soon start on a pipeline through the latter. The plan is that the estimated $3.9 billion, 1,443km pipeline will run from Lake Albert down the western edge of Lake Victoria and to the Tanzanian port at Tanga.
If the decision holds, it means that East Africa may eventually have to construct two separate pipelines. Uganda could have saved the region costs by joining up with Kenya’s pipeline, but it was concerned about security and delays from land disputes in Kenya’s restive north. Kampala was also keen to avoid over-dependence on Nairobi as its dominant trade gateway.
In its bid, Tanzania offered to lower tariffs on the pipeline to competitive rates. It presented a more feasible timetable, fewer land acquisition constraints, and lower security risks.
However, this option will not necessarily be problem free. Over the 30-40 year lifespan of the oil production, politics in both countries will certainly shift, and Tanzania could take advantage of its position as Uganda’s only transit route.
The wildcard in the region’s pipeline politics will be whether Total – given its recent entry into Kenya and majority stakes in Uganda – revives the idea of building a pipeline from Lake Albert to the Kenyan coast, and ditching Tanzania altogether.

 

Kenya

Depending on how this pans out, Kenya may still need to go it alone in building its own pipeline. President Kenyatta says a route from Turkana to Lamu will spur development in the marginalised region and that new economic opportunities will dampen security con­cerns. However, others fear that political elites are looking to further enrich themselves through land grabs in the north.
In any case, the persistence of lower global oil prices means that, in absence of a new deal with Uganda on a regional pipeline, Kenya will likely need to discover more oil if investors are to see financing a Kenya-only pipeline as a fruitful ven­ture.

 

South Sudan

South Sudan may have attained political freedom in 2011, but it is still dependent on a pipeline through Sudan to export oil, the government’s main source of rev­enue.
A deal was struck late last year to extend the arrangement between Juba and Khartoum until the end of 2019. The agreement includes a sliding scale for transit fees, which will help ensure that South Sudan does not run a loss when global prices are low.

 However, the political relationship between the two Sudans is anything but stable, as the short border war in 2012 demonstrated. Khar­toum may attempt to extract new political and economic concessions from South Sudan when the current agreement expires.

       Source: Petroleum Economist.

 

It’s the politics

After years of domestic and regional political wrangling, some progress may be being made in terms of extracting and exporting East African oil. But many disputes are yet to be resolved, while others may still heighten uncertainties.
The undefined and porous borders across Africa, for instance, could lead to further quarrels. Uganda’s exploration on the borer of Lake Albert is already being protested by the Democratic Republic of Congo. Meanwhile, Kenya’s push for maritime exploration in the Indian Ocean is being contested by Somalia.
The implementation of international rulings on disputes elsewhere in Africa – for example, between Nigeria and Cameroon – could set important precedents in solving such border disagreements.
Over a decade on from the initial discoveries, East Africa’s oil is still yet to deliver on its promises. There have been many factors behind the delays, but many have been caused by domestic and regional politics, both of which will continue to be central in determining the success of new growth opportunities.

 A version of this article was originally published in the AFRICAN ARGUMENTS.

RWANDA ELECTIONS,IS IT A FAIR GAME?

"If the Rwandan Patriotic Front is so loved ... why is it that when someone like me decides to run for the presidency, they do all in their power to prevent it?" she asks. "Why are there soldiers all over the place?"

                                                                                             Diane Shima Rwigara.

A former child refugee, Paul Kagame was once a hero to the West, feted for helping to bring Rwanda's bloody genocide to an end.

But with allegations of repression, violence and politically-motivated murder dogging his rule, the military and political leader's international reputation has suffered. Undaunted, the Rwandan leader is standing for re-election on Friday.

Seventeen years into his presidency -- and with the prospect of as many as 17 more to come -- there seems little doubt Kagame will claim victory again come polling day.

"Some people have said that the result of the election is a foregone conclusion. They are not wrong," Kagame said at a rally in Ruhango district, in Rwanda's Southern Province, as the campaign kicked off on July 14.

"Rwandans made their position clear in 2015," he told crowds of supporters, referring to the 2015 referendum in which 98% of voters backed changes to the constitution, allowing him to seek a third, fourth and fifth term in office -- and potentially remain in post until 2034.

life spent in exile

Kagame, who turns 60 this year, had experienced the impact of the Tutsi-Hutu division which threatened to tear his country apart early: he was brought up in exile in neighboring Uganda following an earlier violent uprising in 1959.

Rwanda's then-Vice President Paul Kagame watches a military rally in Kigali on October 1, 1994.

His leadership credentials were forged on the battlefield, first as part of Yoweri Museveni's army which overthrew the regime of Milton Obote in Uganda.

After serving as Museveni's intelligence chief, he led the armed wing of the Rwandan Patriotic Front into Kigali to halt the 1994 genocide, in which almost a million Tutsis were murdered by rival Hutus, and up to two million people fled the country.

Once in power, first as vice president and defense minister, and then from 2000 as president, Kagame -- a Tutsi himself -- pursued those responsible for the genocide across the border into the Democratic Republic of the Congo (then known as Zaire), eliminating many of them.

In the years following the genocide, Rwanda's military clout belied the nation's size, helping to topple Mobutu Sese Seko in the DRC and bring Laurent Kabila to power.

After Kagame fell out with the DRC's new leader, Rwandan troops shifted their allegiance, backing rebels who were trying to overthrow Kabila. They were later accused of plundering the DRC's precious minerals -- a charge the military denied.

Kagame was also accused of arming anti-government militias such as the M23 rebels in eastern DRC. The Rwandan leader denied any involvement.

Three oppositions ruled out of race

Nude photographs purporting to show Diane Shima Rwigara were circulated online after she announced plans to stand in Rwanda's presidential election.

The Rwandan Electoral Commission later ruled that women's rights activist and Kagame critic Rwigara had not collected enough signatures to support her candidacy. It accused her of conspiring to forge voters' signatures, and listing dead people among her backers.

Rwigara says "those are false allegations. The ID numbers released by (the) NEC are different from the ID numbers we submitted to the commission."

"If the Rwandan Patriotic Front is so loved ... why is it that when someone like me decides to run for the presidency, they do all in their power to prevent it?" she asks. "Why are there soldiers all over the place?"

Rwigara says that while Kagame has been good for the country in the past, Rwanda needs a new president to lead the nation into the future.

"After the genocide, the country needed a strong man as a leader to pull the country together," she says. "But that way of leading us is no longer serving us -- on the contrary, it is suffocating us.

Diane Shima Rwigara, 35, had hoped to run for election, but within days of announcing her plans to stand against Kagame, nude photos of her -- which she says were photoshopped -- began to circulate on the internet.

 At home, Kagame is credited with modernizing a nation once at war with itself: the streets are clean, you will see no vagrants, the internet works, plastic bags are banned, and he gives cattle to the poor.

Perhaps most importantly, he has erased the bitterly divisive terms "Hutu" and "Tutsi" -- nowadays, the only accepted identity is "Rwandan."

His supporters also point to the fact that the country has 11 opposition parties, 12 TV stations and 35 radio stations.

Those numbers suggest an atmosphere of plurality and a tolerance of dissenting views, but look again: Nine of the parties have backed Kagame, and many media outlets' coverage of the election campaign has focused solely on the President, offering only his viewpoint.

And while the country boasts the highest proportion of female lawmakers in the world -- 61% of seats in Rwanda's parliament are held by women -- there was no place for a woman on the presidential ballot.

'Peace does not necessaryly mean   democracy'

Rwandan independent candidate Philippe Mpayimana in Shyrongi, north of Kigali on July 29, 2017.

With Rwigara and two other candidates ruled out of the contest by the electoral 

commission, Kagame's only opponents in the race for the presidency are independent Philippe Mpayimana, a former journalist who has spent much of his life in exile in Europe, and Frank Habineza, of the Democratic Green Party.

Habineza believes his party, founded in 2009 is growing fast. He says campaigning against the incumbent has been difficult at times, "some people prevented people from coming to our meeting" early in the campaign.

"We asked for a venue to do our campaign and we were sent to a cemetery -- we had to suspend our campaign because we could not work from a graveyard," he explains.

He says the situation stabilized after the party complained to the Ministry of Local Government and to the police, prompting the local government to take action, issuing a warning to district mayors and local authorities.

Like Rwigara, Habineza concedes that Kagame's rule has had some benefits, but says those are outweighed by the challenges the country still faces.

"One thing we know is that he brought peace and stability to Rwanda, but not democracy," he says. "He failed on democracy and that is my role. He was a former rebel leader, so he has been ruling the country like a soldier."

And that is the dilemma Kagame faces. If -- or, when -- he wins on Friday, he must convince his critics that he knows another way to rule than the one that has caused both his people and his international backers so many concerns.

Uncovering the Italian mafia in Africa

 The Italian mafia has established a hidden but lethal presence in Africa. Its members own diamond mines, nightclubs and land, all with the complicity of corrupt regimes. 

  if you want to fight the mafia, you also need to fight the corruption existing in the political sphere.


The Italian mafia’s influence goes beyond borders; its multiple arms reach several countries and exploit several lucrative sectors. Well-known criminal groups like the Sicilian Cosa Nostra have been investigated for decades, but the recently published project Mafia in Africa uncovers for the first time the actual scope of the mafia’s economic power on the African continent. The team found that important members of the mafia, so-called “capos”, engage in money laundering activities and invest in land, mines or farms in South Africa, Kenya, Namibia and other countries. The same people also establish useful associations with relevant politicians and thus fuel the dynamics of corrupted regimes and unstable markets.
Working on the crossroads between investigative and data journalism, the international team behind the project researched the mafia’s activities in thirteen different countries. Their stories were published in CORRECT!V, L’Espresso, Il Fatto Quotidiano and Mail&Guardian among others. Ultimately, their aim was to show the need to fight the mafia’s criminal practices worldwide.
In order to know more about their investigation and final output, we interviewed our grantee Stefano Gurciullo, director of Quattrogatti.info and the data scientist and coordinator of the project.

What were the main goals of such an ambitious project?
The goal of the project was to find out how and in what sectors and countries the Italian mafia invests. Our investigation does not deal with drug profits, prostitution or weapons, we only deal with money laundering and financial activities. The importance of this project for us was not to just launch a nice investigative project but to spread a message: “this is happening out there, it is huge and we do not know much about it.” We want to convince the public and policy makers to start taking measures against economic infiltration of the mafia. Once we achieve this, we can say that our project has succeeded.

In the project you employ investigative and data journalism. What did you get from this combination?
Using both techniques was not an easy task, but it was very useful. Investigative journalism is usually concerned with the narrative, while data journalism primarily deals with providing the readers a bigger picture. Investigative journalism allows you to discover new data, and the data scientist can create databases and do the quantitative analysis on it. We are really happy to be an example of this.

The most telling of your case studies was South Africa. Could you briefly explain what you uncovered there?
In South Africa we focused on the stories of two Sicilian hustlers, Vito Roberto Palazzolo and Antonino Messicati Vitale. Two well-known cases, but we gave the full picture with in-depth information and big data. In the case of Vito Roberto Palazzolo we did something amazing: we managed to track a huge part of the network of companies he and his collaborators have owned in South Africa, Namibia and Angola over the past 20 years. We essentially tracked nearly his entire economical empire. The story we published is a summary of this. His economic activities were very wide; they went from ostrich farms to uranium mining. We also found that he had connections with important political actors, like the son of the first Namibian president since the independence of the country. The other story in South Africa is about Antonino Messicati Vitale, a powerful boss of the Sicilian mafia, who invested in the diamond mining industry.

After months of research and analysis, you published several long-forms paired with big and detailed infographics. What is their function?
Finding a good way to represent what we discovered was very important to us. For example, we created a map of Africa, which summarises nine months of work in just one image. In a few lines it explains our main findings. The reader can first see the big picture and then decide what story he or she wants to delve into. Our infographics make the story easily accessible.
Another example is the network that depicts Palazzolo’s huge economic empire. Again, in one graphic, you can easily see how big his influence was. This is twenty pages of story summed up in just one graph.
What are the consequences of the mafia’s economic infiltration and money laundering practices in Africa?
There are two direct consequences, one is political and the other economic. What we found out was that the Italian mafia strengthened the Politics of the Belly in Africa—a form of political governance characterised by self-aggrandisement. The mafia come as outsiders, but they have friends across the African political spectrum, which allows them to take part in high-level corrupted politics that exist in many African countries. We saw this very clearly with Vito Roberto Palazzolo, but we did not have enough resources to go more in-depth.
Another consequence is that if you have a lot of money coming from illegal funds and you decide to enter a legitimate market, this is unfair towards the other competitors. Unlike the mafia, these competitors do not engage in illegal activities. This situation just as much distorts the market as it dismantles innovation.

Did you receive any kind or pressure from actors somehow involved in the criminal network during the investigation?
We have been very careful. Minimising risk in the field means making sure to follow some protocols, such as keeping your project goals reasonably confidential and following the indications of your local colleagues, who know very well what threats might lie ahead.
We are happy to say that we did not receive any significant pressure from the actors involved. However, there always is the chance that this may change soon, as we start engaging closely with policy makers and bring the issue of financial and economic crime higher up in their agendas. We do not know what form this pressure might take. It may range from personal threats to lawsuits.

You wrote that this first project was like discovering the tip of the iceberg. What do you plan to do next?
This was only the first step. It is part of a broader project through which we encourage policymakers to pay attention to the mafia’s global business. If we get enough funding, the next step will be to find reliable information to track the mafia’s practices in other countries, also outside of Africa. Africa is just one part of the story. For instance, we also found connections between Vito Roberto Palazzolo and the biggest diamond mining in Russia. Few people knew about it before. It would be really interesting to conduct the same research we did on the African continent in Asia, the Caucasus area or Latin America, for example.

What was the most surprising finding for you?
I think that each team member would give you a different answer. To me, the most striking thing was the value of the diamond deposit Vito Roberto Palazzolo had in Russia. The total value of them was 12 billion dollars. Palazzolo, together with another entrepreneur owned 17%. He also had diamond mines in Namibia. I was really shocked that they had control over these huge sources of money.
The second surprising finding was to see, with my own eyes, how well connected these people were with very important political figures, how they always had a partnership with whoever was in power, especially in Namibia. This fact gave us the confirmation that if you want to fight the mafia, you also
  need to fight the corruption existing in the political sphere.

 The Italian mafia has established a hidden but lethal presence in Africa. Its members own diamond mines, nightclubs and land, all with the complicity of corrupt regimes.


Italian anti-mafia authorities estimate that organised crime groups earn €26 billion a year in Italy alone. But the figure only scratches the surface of its economic power. Mafia Inc. is more than ever a global business, infiltrating legitimate economies worldwide. And the extent of the empire is unknown.
An international team of reporters from the non-profit investigative journalism centres IRPI and ANCIR (with the Investigative Dashboard Africa) partnered with the data analysts of QUATTROGATTI and the production room of CORRECT!V to uncover for the first time the Italian mafia's grip on Africa.

Supported by two working grants for independent journalism, the Innovative Journalism Grant of the EJC and Journalism Fund, the work took seven months, and included trips to Sicily, Calabria, Campania, Lazio, Lombardy, in Italy and South Africa, Namibia, Senegal and Kenya, in Africa.
Ten investigative reporters from six different countries, one data-journalist and a data-scientist, three editors, one cross-examiner and a bunch of lawyers joined the effort in producing in-depth research into the mafia's involvement in 13 countries.
Mafia in Africa draws a bleak picture and highlights the need for the international community to reforms its policies, to monitor and fight the economic infiltration by criminals and prevent the dire consequences on unstable African societies.

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DR Congo’s would-be president,Moïse Katumbi

“The same people who betrayed Mobutu are now with Kabila, telling him he’s God, telling him he’s whatever. It’s bullshit.”

 

Moïse Katumbi:credit NYUMBA

 

For a man many see as the natural heir to the presidency of the vast and populous Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Moïse Katumbi cuts a fairly reserved figure. A gentle and sometimes bashful tycoon-turned-politician, one gets the sense that if he were his biblical namesake, his instinct would be to strike a behind-the-scenes deal with the Red Sea rather than command it to part with a booming authority.
Whatever his approach, however, it has put him in good stead. The son of a Jewish father from Greece and a Congolese mother, Katumbi, now a youthful 52,  first made his mark in business. He inherited a role in the already-successful family company in Katanga province, but expanded its activities in mining and logistics. All of which helped make him one of the Congo’s richest people.
From 2007 to 2015, he was  governor of Katanga, which saw impressive economic growth and development. Under his presidency of the Lubumbashi football team TP Mazembe, the club has won the African Champions League three times.
Now Katumbi wants to be president of the country. If free and fair elections were held, he probably would be. He has significant popularity and the support of much of the opposition. But when he’ll get a chance to test this hypothesis is anyone’s guess.
President Joseph Kabila, who has led the DRC since 2001, was meant to step down when his second mandated term expired on 19 December 2016. But he simply failed to organise elections. Protests escalated until an agreement was made on 31 December that a transitional government would be established − with Kabila still as president − and that elections would be held in 2017. Yet more than halfway through the year, the polls are no closer and the electoral commission recently announced that they have been delayed indefinitely.
Moreover, in 2016, Katumbi was sentenced to 36 months in absentia for selling a property illegally. The charges are widely considered to be politically-motivated, but they mean he is stuck in exile in Brussels.
African Arguments caught up with the wannabe Congolese president:

You’ve said repeatedly now that you’ll be returning to the DRC shortly. Do you know when yet?
  I’m going as quick as possible. I went with my lawyer to the High Commission for Human Rights in Geneva and got a good answer, so I’m definitely going back. I miss my country and my people.

Do you have a date?
The date is soon. I’m like a general. I need to plan everything properly.
You have much support in the DRC, but many also distrust you, including various grassroots movements that are doing much of the mobilising on the ground today. They see you as someone who’s always lived in luxury, eating at expensive restaurants and flying in private jets, while two-thirds of Congolese live in poverty. Why should they believe in you?
In a democracy, not everyone will love you. The majority would like me to run as president. I was first a businessman. 95-97% know the true story about Moïse Katumbi. I was a hardworking person, 30 years in business, a successful businessman. I didn’t go bankrupt.
When I started as governor of Katanga, the province was sending $150 million to the national level per annum. After one year, it went to $3 billion because I fought corruption. When I am president, all the people will see the change. They can look on my website, they can talk to Katangese people to see my contribution.

How will you convince the doubters?
Kabila is attacking me – only me – because he knows in the first round I will win the elections. When I arrived as governor of Katanga, Congo was producing just 8,000 tonnes of copper per annum. I stopped exports of unprocessed material and told people to build new factories. We went from 8,000 tonnes to 1.3 million tonnes.  My province was the size of France, with 4.5 million people. Within one year, the population doubled as people came from their provinces to look for good governance and jobs.

You criticise Kabila now, but you were very close to him for many years. How are substantively different from him? What specific policy changes would you make if you were president tomorrow?
I can’t deny I worked with Kabila. The constitution allowed me two terms, which I did. President Kabila today is illegal. He finished his mandate in 2016. The difference between us first is that I respected the constitution. I didn’t kill anyone. I didn’t jail anyone.
What is important is the future. I would first establish the authority of government and law. I’d fight corruption. Create jobs. We need to have a strong economy. How? First, you need energy. Congo has a lot of water and no energy. I would call the private sector and all partners to help us and use money you have locally to improve energy.
You need to create the middle-class. Also transparency, which is very important in the mining sector and all sectors. You’ve got the best place for tourism. You have to develop this. And develop education. The future of Congo is not mining but the brains of our young people. And develop agriculture. At the moment, our money is going to other countries for imports. We need to create jobs in agriculture. And the money must go to the central government and be published. You must not violate the budget. The president is going over the budget sometimes by 700%.

Surely everyone, including Kabila, would largely agree that all these things are important. What specifically would you do?
What I say is that I’ve done it when I was the governor. It’s not just theory. Take education. When I started, we had 300,000 students at school and less than 10% were girls. I built good infrastructure and paid teachers well. We went to over 3 million children after 9 years, 50% of whom were girls. When I began, we were importing 98% of our agriculture. When I left office, we were importing 25%, because I put everyone to work on agriculture.

The main difference you emphasise between you and Kabila seems to be that he violated the constitution. If he’d stepped down last year, would he have been a good president?
Kabila missed the train. He was supposed to leave on time, not kill the people. If he left, the international community and Congolese would be happy. No matter what he did wrong, people would respect him as the first president to bring democracy.
He did good things, he did bad things. Now everything has become very bad because of the killing.

From Kabila’s perspective, his strategies have worked. The elections are no closer, while the opposition’s divided. Veteran opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi has passed away. You’re in exile. And the wealthy businessman and recent critic of Kabila, Sindika Dokolo, has just been sentenced to a year in prison. What’s your plan to change things?
These are short manoeuvres. You think Sindika Dokolo can steal $1 million? His father was the first black banker in the country. Because Dokolo is telling Kabila to step down, the president’s only strategy is to take him down with fake charges, like he did with me. He thinks this is successful, but this is a short road.

And how will you bring that road to an end?
We are bringing it to an end because our constitution gives us the right to remove him. At the moment, he doesn’t have any legal frame. The people are going to chase Kabila because Article 64 of our constitution allows us. We’re going to say “Mr President, the game is over”. In life, you have to always be true. You can’t be clever to more than 80 million people. The end is sure to come this year. Kabila will no longer be president.

Yes, but how will you bring this about? At the moment, he seems to hold all the cards.
Killings is not a card, killing is evil.
But it helps keep him in power.
It works for some time. You have read widely. All the people who killed, what is their end? Their end is very bad.

Perhaps, but sometimes only after decades of rule.
For us, it is not going to take decades. Congo is not other countries. 80 million people need change. Kabila should wake up.

Ok, so would you encourage people to go onto the streets to force this change?
Yes. I’m also going on the streets and will encourage the people, because today people are dying and no serious investors have come to the country since 2016.

Going back to Dokolo, there are rumours the two of you are forming a political alliance. Is this true?
Sindika is a Congolese brother first. He’s a businessman and just inaugurated a cement factory in Angola. He works hard. He wants to contribute to change in Congo. You see how they are killing pregnant women and children in the Kasai. Sindika wants change in the country like any Congolese person.

Given you share that goal, does it make sense to join forces?
Not just the two of us. I was with Sidika Dokolo and Félix Tshisekedi. It’s all the Congolese people, civil society, everyone. We need real change. Congolese people today are determined. I have met a lot of Congolese children born in Europe who want to go back and contribute.

Before you resigned from the ruling coalition, you talked to President Kabila. He offered you something, but you declined. What happened in that meeting?
I went to see the president to tell him “Mr President, in life there is a time to come to office and a time to go”. I said Congo is not about you, it’s about 80 million people. It’s not about Moïse Katumbi, it’s about the people.
I advised him not to continue, but to have the first peaceful democratic transition. The same people who betrayed Mobutu are now with Kabila, telling him he’s God, telling him he’s whatever. It’s bullshit. He should look at how Mobutu was finished because the people of Congo at that time needed change.

This interview has been condensed and edited.

 

Rwanda’s election results already decided

 

Only President Paul Kagame has a chance of winning the 2017 presidential election. And he could stay in power until 2034.

  President Paul Kagame has been in power since 1994 

“More of a coronation than real contest.” That’s how the Kenyan daily The Standard characterised Rwanda’s presidential poll slated for 4 August. It sums up the reality well. In countries with competitive politics, elections are an important moment giving rise to debate and excitement. Not so in Rwanda.
Rwandans have become accustomed to polls where everything is settled in advance. This was the case before the genocide, when the country was officially a one-party state. And it has been the case since 1994, after which Rwanda became a de facto one-party state under the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).
The current template for elections was set in 2003, when a constitutional referendum and the first post-genocide elections were held. In the run-up to these polls, the last genuine opposition party was banned, while the campaign was marred by arrests, disappearances and intimidation. An EU observer mission noted that, ironically, “political pluralism is more limited than during the transition period”.
The polls themselves were replete with allegations of fraud, manipulation of electoral lists, ballot-box stuffing, and flawed counting. Paul Kagame was declared the winner with 95% of the vote.
Similar dynamics were seen in the 2008 and 2013 parliamentary elections as well as the 2010 presidential poll. Opposition leaders were arrested and condemned to long prison sentences, while other critical voices were killed or went into exile.
In 2010, there were reports of local leaders going from door to door to collect voters’ cards and submitting their ballots for them. The Commonwealth observer mission at the time noted that “it was not possible to ascertain quite where, how and when the tabulation was completed”.

 

Kagame until 2034?

The presidential elections in 2010 were expected to be Kagame’s last. He was beginning his second constitutionally-mandated seven-year term and denied that he would seek re-election. He even claimed it would be a failure on his part not to find a replacement and warned that “those who seek a third term will seek a fourth and a fifth”.
Nevertheless, many remained sceptical that Kagame would step down, and in May 2013, his position became clearer when Justice Minister Tharcisse Karugarama was sacked shortly after insisting in an interview that Kagame would have to leave power in 2017 in accordance with the law.
By this time, a campaign had already started aimed at “convincing” the president to stay in office. In 2015, this culminated in 3.7 million Rwandans signing a petition – some under significant pressure – demanding that parliament enact constitutional changes that would allow Kagame to remain in power. It was claimed that this was a spontaneous action by the people, but it is unlikely such an operation could have been organised without the president’s knowledge and direction.
In subsequent “consultations” on the matter held throughout the country, MPs and senators claimed to have only found ten people – out of a population of 11 million – who opposed the initiative. Soon after, both houses unanimously approved a constitutional amendment to be put to a referendum.
The proposed revision called for maintaining the two-term limit and reducing term lengths from seven to five years. It also included a crucial provision allowing the incumbent to first run for an additional seven-year term, after which he would be eligible to bid for two more five-year terms. The changes effectively allow Kagame to stay in power until 2034, by which time he would have ruled Rwanda for 40 years.
While the issue of term limits has led to protests in many African countries, in Rwanda there was no debate or demonstrations around the December 2015 referendum. This was not surprising given that since the RPF took power, no demonstrations have taken place that were not organised by the regime itself. The amendment passed with 98.3% of the popular vote.
On 31 December 2015, President Kagame announced that he would run again, saying: “You requested me to lead this country again after 2017. Given the importance and consideration you attach to this, I can only accept”.

 

The candidates

Others also declared their intention to stand in 2017, including a handful of independents, but they have faced significant obstructions.
In May 2017, 35-year-old Diana Rwigara announced her candidacy, saying “people are tired, people are angry”. She had previously shown courage in criticising the government and human rights abuses. In the days following her announcement, doctored nude photographs of her circulated on social media.
Another aspirant, the Catholic prelate turned politician Thomas Nahimana, was denied access to Rwanda. Meanwhile, Gilbert Mwenedata, claimed that he was refused rooms by hotels in Kigali to hold a press conference to announce his plans.
The challenges facing independent candidates are dauntingly high to begin with. To be eligible, they must collect 600 signatures of support, including at least 12 from each of 30 districts. This may not seem much, but in an environment that does not tolerate criticism of the regime, it takes a lot of courage to reveal oneself to be an opposition supporter. Rwigara claimed that local leaders threatened her supporters as they tried to gather signatures.
Nevertheless, at least two hopefuls – Rwigara and Mwenedata – claimed to have met this requirement. But the National Electoral Commission (NEC) rejected their candidacies, claiming many of the signatures gathered were invalid. The NEC did not allow the candidates to see their lists to work out which names were disqualified, and several diplomats in Kigali expressed concern over the process.
In the end, only one independent hopeful – the little-known former journalist Philippe Mpayimana – made it onto the NEC’s final list.
The barriers for political parties are less onerous, and the Democratic Green Party’s (DGP) Frank Habineza was affirmed as the third and final presidential candidate. All other parties announced that they would not field nominees, but instead back Kagame.

 

No level playing field

As in previous elections in Rwanda, 2017’s opposition candidates have not faced an easy time or a level playing field in the run up to the polls.
While the RPF benefits from vast financial resources through its business ventures, other hopefuls were warned by the NEC against raising funds before being declared eligible. The electoral commission also announced in May that any social media messages by candidates or parties had to be submitted for vetting 48 hours prior to publication. Habineza called the decision “oppressive” and, after strong diplomatic protest, the measure was rescinded in early-June.
Opposition parties – in particular the non-registered FDU-Inkingi – have also seen their cadres arrested or disappeared. Amnesty International recently denounced the climate of fear surrounding the elections, saying: “Since the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front took power 23 years ago, Rwandans have faced huge, and often deadly, obstacles to participating in public life and voicing criticism of government policy. The climate in which the upcoming elections take place is the culmination of years of repression.”
In these tense and oppressive circumstances, and given the widespread allegations of manipulation in Rwanda’s previous elections, it is not surprising that the head of the EU delegation in Kigali has said that “you would not lose any money if you bet on Mr Paul Kagame”.
Indeed, a 90% or higher victory for Kagame on 4 August seems inevitable in what will be coronation rather than election. All this is underscored by the latest Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) report in which Rwanda scored a mere two out of ten for “free and fair elections” and “effective power to govern”, and three for “association/assembly rights” and “freedom of expression”.

 

 

UGANDAN TROOPS HARM WOMEN,GIRLS. "CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC"

UGANDAN TROOPS HARM WOMEN,GIRLS. "CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC"

Repeated Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

 

 "Karin," a 15 year old girl in obo who was eight months pregnant at the time of the photo,She told the Human Rights Watch  that a ugandan soldier paid her up to 5,000 CFA (approximately $8.30 USD) to be his local "wife". LEWIS MUGDE/HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 

 

 (Nairobi) – Ugandan soldiers in the Central African Republic have sexually exploited or abused at least 13 women and girls since 2015, including at least one rape, and threatened some victims to remain silent, Human Rights Watch said today. The Ugandan military has been deployed in the country since 2009 as a part of the African Union’s Regional Task Force to eliminate the Uganda rebel group, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), but recently announced it is withdrawing its troops.

 

 Human Rights Watch interviewed a total of 13 women and 3 girls in early 2017, who described exploitation or abuse since 2010 by Ugandan soldiers in the southeastern town of Obo, where Ugandan forces were based, and heard credible accounts of other cases. Two of the women were girls when the exploitation or abuse took place. Two women and one girl said that soldiers threatened reprisals if they told Ugandan and United Nations investigators about the abuse.

 

  “As counter-LRA operations wind down, Uganda’s military should not ignore allegations of sexual exploitation and rape by its soldiers in the Central African Republic,” said Lewis Mudge, Africa researcher at Human Rights Watch. “Ugandan and African Union authorities should conduct proper investigations, punish those responsible, and make sure that the women and girls who were sexually abused or exploited get the services they need.”
Fifteen of the women and girls interviewed said they became pregnant, but in each case the soldier who fathered the child left the country and has not provided any support.
The 16 cases documented by Human Rights Watch clearly under-represent the full extent of sexual exploitation and abuse by the Ugandan forces, not only because sexual violence is generally underreported, but also because others, including the UN and local health workers, have documented other cases, Human Rights Watch said. In the Central African Republic, women and girls often do not report sexual violence or exploitation due to shame, stigma, or fear of retaliation.
In 2016, the UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights reported 14 cases of rape by Ugandan forces in the country, including cases involving victims who were children at the time. Four of these cases are among those Human Rights Watch documented.

 A 26 year old woman who gave birth to two children after being exploited by a ugandan soldier.He left obo in 2015 while she was pregnant with the second child."He proposed that i should be his "wife,'she said.he said he would give me money and i accepted because i needed the money.He would come and visit often and some times everyday.He would bring me 5,000 CFA.(Approximately $8.30 USD) a week.Its because i was in a difficult situation that i accepted. LEWIS MUGDE/HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

According to an internal UN report from 2016 obtained by Human Rights Watch, UN investigators in Obo registered 18 cases of sexual violence or harassment by Ugandan soldiers against women and girls who were afraid to give details out of fear of reprisals. The report states that investigators also obtained information about 44 women and girls with children fathered by Ugandan soldiers; the UN team interviewed 12 of them, all girls.
In January 2017, the BBC reported cases of rape by Ugandan soldiers in the Central African Republic, including of a 12-year-old girl who gave birth. The Ugandan military said at the time that it conducted an investigation in Obo and found no evidence of wrongdoing.
Human Rights Watch submitted a series of questions about the allegations to the Ugandan Ministry of Defence and Veterans Affairs on April 20, including about any investigations or disciplinary action, but the ministry has not replied.
Several women and girls told Human Rights Watch that Ugandan military investigators had interviewed them over the past year, but that there was no follow-up and they had no information about the investigation.
Two local organizations, one religious leader, and one journalist in Obo also told Human Rights Watch that Ugandan forces had warned them not to report cases of sexual exploitation and abuse.
The rape survivor interviewed by Human Rights Watch, 15-year-old “Marie,” said a Ugandan soldier assaulted her in January 2016, while she was working in the fields near the Ugandan base at the Obo airstrip. “The man was alone… I could not understand what he was saying,” she said. “He pushed me to the ground [and he raped me]. Afterward, there was real pain.”
“Marie” became pregnant from the rape and gave birth to a child in November 2016.
Fifteen of the women and girls interviewed said they had sex with Ugandan military personnel in exchange for food or money because the ongoing conflict and their displacement had left them desperate. Several said the Ugandan soldiers offered them food and money to be their “local wives,” which entailed having sex and doing domestic work. Fourteen of these women and girls had a child fathered by a Ugandan soldier. All of them said they received no support from the soldier and most said their social and economic situation worsened after the child was born.
Rape; sex in exchange for money, goods, or services; and sex with anyone under 18 by African Union (AU) military, police, or civilians qualify as sexual exploitation and abuse, and are prohibited by the AU. The AU states a zero-tolerance policy for sexual exploitation and abuse.
The women and girls, healthcare workers, and local officials Human Rights Watch interviewed in Obo said that Ugandan soldiers paying for sex was no secret in the community, and women and girls frequently visited the military base by the air strip. “I could spend the night in the base, there were no problems,” said “Karin,” a 15-year-old girl who became pregnant in 2016 by a Ugandan soldier.
On April 19, 2017, the Ugandan Defense Ministry announced its withdrawal from the Central African Republic, saying, “the mission to neutralize the LRA has now been successfully achieved.” Ugandan forces could join the UN peacekeeping mission in the country, MINUSCA, to continue operations against the LRA, the ministry added.
MINUSCA should not consider accepting any Ugandan troops for the UN mission until allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse have been credibly investigated and abusers held to account, Human Rights Watch said.
While in Obo, Ugandan forces received logistical and intelligence assistance from the United States. The US government should condition future support for the Ugandan military on Uganda promptly and thoroughly investigating the allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse in the Central African Republic and punishing the abusers, among other concerns, Human Rights Watch said.
The Ugandan and AU authorities should prioritize the security and well-being of survivors in its response to sexual exploitation and abuse, Human Rights Watch said. That should include assuring survivor’s safety, maintaining confidentiality to reduce the risk of stigmatization, minimizing repeated trauma due to multiple interviews, ensuring timely access to medical and mental health, or psychosocial, care, and providing socioeconomic support to survivors abandoned with children fathered by Ugandan military personnel.
AU forces in the Central African Republic have committed other serious crimes with impunity in recent years. In June 2016, Human Rights Watch published information on the murder of at least 18 people, including women and children, by peacekeepers from the Republic of Congo. At the time, the Congolese peacekeepers were under the command of the AU mission in the Central African Republic, known as MISCA. The AU prepared an internal report on the killings but has not released the findings.
“Both AU and troop-contributing countries should demonstrate full commitment to punish sexual exploitation and abuse in deployment areas,” Mudge said. “They need to enforce the zero-tolerance policy and prevent abuse of the people these missions are meant to protect.”
 


The Effort Against the LRA
In 2011, the African Union’s Peace and Security Council authorized the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA (RCI-LRA), which included as the military component the Regional Task Force (RTF). The RTF drew its operational forces largely from the Ugandan army. Approximately 1,500 Ugandan military forces were deployed to the Central African Republic.
The US announced in October 2011 that it would send 100 US Special Forces personnel as military advisers to the Ugandan army and other armed forces in the region to assist in apprehending LRA leaders. In recent years, and as LRA groups have moved, nearly all of the US military advisers and Ugandan army soldiers involved have been based in the southeast, with a headquarters in Obo.
Both Ugandan and US forces have announced they will withdraw from the mission in the upcoming months.
 

Sexual Exploitation and Rape
Human Rights Watch documented one case of rape of a girl (15 years old), and 15 cases of sexual exploitation by Ugandan military forces, including of two girls (15 and 17 years old), and two who were girls at the time the exploitation took place.
Thirteen of the cases occurred after 2015, with the most recent in late 2016. Fifteen of the 16 subsequently gave birth, including two who were 17 when they became pregnant.
“Marie,” the 15-year-old rape survivor, told Human Rights Watch that her attacker was a soldier based in Obo. “He was a young man,” she said. “This soldier raped me and now it is difficult to think about what happened. It was not good and I think about it a lot.”
“Marie” received some medical care after the attack but no information about getting an abortion after she learned she was pregnant (see below). She gave birth to the child in November 2016.
Among the cases investigated by the UN, according to an internal report Human Rights Watch reviewed, one was of a 13-year-old girl who was “raped two times by UPDF [Ugandan military] soldiers in Obo, first in August 2015 and the second time on May 20, 2016.”
A 25-year-old woman, “Blandine,” said she felt she had no choice but to be a Ugandan “wife” because a soldier gave her between 3,000 CFA and 5,000 CFA per week (approximately US$5 to $8.30) in return. “I needed the money,” she said. “I am a farmer and I am poor. I only went to school for a few years… With that money I would buy food and I would do small business.”
A 28-year-old woman, “Margaret,” said she was also not able to refuse money from a Ugandan soldier. “He would give me 1,000 CFA (approximately US$1.60) or some small food after sex. It would be a sachet of corn meal or maybe cabbage or tomatoes,” she said. “I started this relationship with [him] because I needed this small amount of money he gave me, that is all.”
“Francine,” 23, said she had sex with a Ugandan soldier for two to three months in 2015 because he gave her food and money. “He was looking for a woman that he could have sex with but he did not want too many [women] for fear of contracting AIDS,” she said. “He said he would give me 10,000 CFA (approximately US$16.70) to be his wife.”
“Francine” stressed how common the exploitation was in town. “All the Ugandans do this,” she said. “They don’t need to hide it because it is completely normal.”
 

Exploited and Abandoned
Seven women and one girl said they knew the name of the Ugandan soldier who had paid them for sex, but the others did not. None of the 15 who had a child as a result of the exploitation knew how to contact the soldier who had abandoned them.
“Claire,” 25, said that when she was six months pregnant, the Ugandan soldier who had impregnated her told her he was leaving the following day. “He refused to give me his number in Uganda,” she said. “When I insisted he said, ‘What for? You are just going to call and bother me.’”
“Margaret” said that the Ugandan father of her child, born in early 2015, refused to give her his phone number in Uganda. “No, the child is my gift to you,” she said he told her. “It will be a souvenir to remember me by.”
Six women and girls said Ugandan military personnel had promised to take them to Uganda for a better life in exchange for acting as a soldier’s “wife.”
A 25-year-old mother of a child from a Ugandan soldier, “Claude,” said a Ugandan soldier convinced her to become his “wife” in 2014. “He said he would marry me and take me to Uganda if I accepted to be his ‘wife,’” she said. “He said he would give me what I wanted and needed as his ‘wife,’ so I accepted.”
“Rebecca,” 22, said she agreed to be a Ugandan soldier’s “wife” when she was 17. “He fooled me and he said he would take me to Uganda as his own wife – I believed him,” she said. “I was young and stupid. We were together for a year. Sometimes he would come to the house, sometimes I would go to the base.” “Rebecca” had a child with the soldier when she was still 17.
A 21-year-old woman, “Alphonsine,” said a Ugandan soldier promised her money, food, and a home in Uganda. Over the course of five years, they had two children together. He abandoned her and the children in November 2015, when he returned to Uganda. “I think about my situation and how I was fooled,” she said. “Now it is very difficult for me to find money for food and soap.”
30-year-old “Jeanette,” who had a child from a Ugandan soldier in 2015, said she had sex with him because she needed money and food. “Now I need more money and food because I have to feed and clothe this child, too,” she said.
 

Services for Survivors
Most of the women and girls interviewed had not been able to get medical or mental health care.
“Marie,” the rape survivor, was able to access some critical post-rape medical care in the days after she was attacked. She was tested for HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted infections, but no one provided her with information about access to abortion after it was established she was pregnant.
Eight women said the Ugandan soldier with whom they had sex gave them money, ranging from 1,000 CFA to 30,000 CFA (approximately US$1.60 to $50), for medical care during their pregnancy. But all of them said it was not sufficient for the multiple check-ups required, and they either had to find the money elsewhere or forgo appointments.
None had any psychosocial support to deal with the trauma, despite the presence of at least one international organization that offers this service. The women and girls interviewed by Human Rights Watch said they were not aware this service existed.
None had received social or economic support from the AU or other agencies. Several spoke of stigma in their communities associated with having a “Ugandan baby.” This stigma could lead to greater socioeconomic needs. “People in the neighborhood call my child ‘the Ugandan,’” said Rebecca. “The other kids make fun of her and tell her I am the abandoned wife of a Ugandan.”
Ugandan Investigations
Ugandan military investigators interviewed several survivors over the past year, but the survivors said they had not had any communication with the investigators after the interviews and were unaware of other follow up. The women and girls said they had no means to contact the investigators.
Human Rights Watch sent a letter to the Ugandan Defense Ministry on April 20, 2017, asking, among other questions, what steps the ministry had taken to investigate the allegations. The ministry has not replied.
A Ugandan military spokesman, Brig. Gen. Richard Karemire, told the BBC in January that military investigators had visited Obo but found no evidence of wrongdoing. “A team went on the ground and did a very good investigation and they never found anything really to implicate any UPDF [Ugandan military] individual for having perpetrated such crimes,” he said.
 

Threats to Stay Silent
Two women and one girl who were sexually exploited said that Ugandan soldiers had warned them not to speak to any investigators looking into sexual exploitation and abuse. “Claire” said that Ugandan soldiers approached her in 2016, before Ugandan investigators arrived in Obo. “The soldiers came to my house and told me to say the child was a Central African,” she said. “They told me, ‘Don’t say the boy is a Ugandan or it will make problems for you. It will be bad.’ I said, ‘How can it get worse? I have been abandoned with nothing anyway.’”
“Karin,” the 15-year-old girl who was sexually exploited and left pregnant, said Ugandan soldiers warned her not to speak with Ugandan investigators. She decided to speak to the investigators anyway because she had already been abandoned while pregnant and felt she had nothing to lose.
The internal UN report Human Rights Watch obtained says that UN investigators in Obo registered 18 cases of sexual violence or sexual harassment by Ugandan soldiers against women and girls who were too fearful of reprisals by Ugandan soldiers to give details about their cases. Two local organizations, a religious leader, and one journalist in Obo also said Ugandan forces had warned them not to report sexual exploitation and abuse. The religious leader said: “The Ugandans are here to protect us, but they can also threaten us. They know that they are not meant to [have sex with people in the community] and they do not want people talking to journalists about it.”
The Central African Republic is not the only country where Ugandan soldiers have raped and exploited women and girls while on an AU mission. In 2014, Human Rights Watch documented that Ugandan and Burundian military personnel from the AU mission in Somalia, known as AMISOM, had exploited and abused women, including raping women who were seeking water or medical assistance on AMISOM bases. Some women said they did not report the abuse because they feared reprisals from their attackers. Human Rights Watch has previously raised concerns with the Ugandan Defense Ministry regarding similar allegations against Ugandan troops in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2011.
 

AU Policy on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
The UN defines exploitation as “any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another.” The UN considers “sexual abuse” to mean the actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions.
In September 2014, Human Rights Watch reported on 21 acts of rape or sexual exploitation by Ugandan and Burundian military personal with the AU mission in Somalia, AMISOM. Following this report, the AU sent an independent investigation team to Somalia. A recommendation in its final report called for the AU Commission to establish an Office of Internal Oversight Services with similar responsibilities to an independent UN office that investigates, submits reports, and recommends action on alleged abuses by UN peacekeepers. The UN policy on peacekeepers’ conduct prohibits engaging in any sexual relations with members of the local community. The AU should establish a permanent and adequately trained and resourced independent investigative body to investigate allegations of misconduct and abuses, including sexual exploitation and abuse, Human Rights Watch said.
Despite allegations made in the past, the AU does not have a comprehensive conduct and discipline policy for AU peacekeepers or soldiers who commit sexual exploitation and abuse. It is working on a policy framework that will include prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse, how to respond to reports of other types of offenses, and a whistleblower policy. It is unclear if the policy will result in establishing an independent investigative mechanism, along the lines of the UN agency as recommended in the report from Somalia.
The UN considers rape; sex in exchange for money, goods, or services; and sex with anyone under 18 by UN military, police, or civilians to be sexual exploitation and abuse, which are prohibited by the UN. The UN professes a zero-tolerance policy for sexual exploitation and abuse. There have been numerous allegations of such abuse against UN peacekeepers in the Central African Republic, including in cases documented by Human Rights Watch in February 2016.
The United Nations Secretary-General’s 2003 Bulletin on protection from sexual exploitation and abuse states that exploitation involves situations in which women and girls are vulnerable and a differential power relationship exists.
 

Other Abuses by AU Peacekeepers in the Central African Republic
Human Rights Watch has reported on other serious crimes by troops operating as AU peacekeepers in the Central African Republic. In June 2014, Human Rights Watch published information on the killing of at least 11 people, including women and children, in Boali in March 2014, and the death by torture of two others in Bossangoa in December 2013.
In June 2016, Human Rights Watch published another report on the killings in Boali, highlighting the discovery of a mass grave containing the remains of 12 people who were identified as having been detained by the peacekeepers in March 2014, as well as two prisoners executed in Mambéré in February 2014.
The killings in Boali, Bossangoa, and Mambéré were by peacekeepers from the Republic of Congo under command of the AU mission, known by its French acronym, MISCA.
Following the exhumation of the mass grave at Boali, Human Rights Watch wrote to President Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Republic of Congo and to the AU urging credible investigations to bring those responsible to justice. Human Rights Watch never received a reply.
In 2015, staff at the AU embassy in the Central African Republic told Human Rights Watch of an AU report into the murders at Boali. Despite official requests in 2015, 2016, and 2017, Human Rights Watch was never shown the report nor been told of its contents.