Uganda: Age Limit Bill lined up,why now?

Uganda: Age Limit Bill lined up,why now?

 

After months of speculation, the omnibus Constitution (Amendment) Bill, which contains a clause to remove the presidential age limit, has been lined up to be officially gazetted.

We have seen a copy of The Uganda Gazette dated June 8, 2017 where the Constitution (Amendment) Bill is listed as one of the bills that are due to be published.

Sources said the bill shall be published in the gazette in a few weeks' time. Interviewed for a confirmation on Friday, June 30, Maj Gen Kahinda Otafiire, the minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, said the Constitution (Amendment) Bill 2017 awaits to be published in The Uganda Gazette before it can come to parliament for debate.

The Uganda Gazette, according to the ministry of Justice's website, is the "official newspaper of government."

Otafiire said: "Once the bill has been gazetted, a Constitutional Review Commission shall be appointed and it will gather views from the people."

Otafiire added that all articles of the Constitution, including 102 that touches on the qualifications for one to be a president,will be up for possible amendment.

"What is so special about Article 102? Is it a commandment from God? If the public wants the age-limit amended, it will be amended. If they don't want, we shall leave it," Otafiire said.

Specifically, Article 102 (b) states that a person is not qualified for election as president of Uganda if he or she is "less than thirty-five years and or more than seventy-five years of age."

The fiery minister continued: "The Constitution is not my property. I am just a custodian. If people want some articles to be amended, it is their right."

Otafiire's remarks confirm earlier speculation that government plans to have the presidential age cap abolished despite public denial by senior government officials.

In a 2012 interview that is now commonly shared on social media, President Museveni told NTV: "I don't think someone can be an effective leader after 75 years."

However, since his re-election last year, the president has been more circumspect, simply telling journalists that he will follow the Constitution.

SEVERAL ATTEMPTS

 Museveni, who turns 73 later this year, will be 76 by 2021 and thus ineligible to stand for president under the constitution as it is today. Political analysts predict that just as he did in the run-up to the lifting of presidential term limits in 2005, President Museveni will distance himself from the move to remove the age-limit, leaving it to his outspoken supporters in and out of the NRM-dominated parliament.

Some politicians, seeking to catch his attention, have already stoked the potentially fiery debate. In August 2016, the Kyankwanzi district leadership drafted a resolution in support of an amendment to lift the age-limit.

Led by Woman MP Ann Maria Nankabirwa, the resolution was handed to a smiling President Museveni after a meeting of both parties. Later on, it was Robert Kafeero Ssekitooleko's turn to catch the president's attention. In September 

 2016, the Nakifuma MP tried in vain to table a private member's bill that was seen as a ruse to lift the presidential age limit in the Constitution.

On the face of it, the bill aimed to raise the retirement age of judges and give electoral 

 commissioners an extended tenure but, under 

the surface, it was believed to be targeting Article 102(b).

The Nakifuma MP's move collapsed on September 13, 2016 after Speaker of Parliament Rebecca Kadaga directed that the motion be shelved until government tables an omnibus bill with all constitutional amendments therein.

Ssekitooleko is now understood to be part of a group of MPs actively working to figure out how the age-limit clause can be set aside.

Others, according to our sources, are, John Bosco Lubyayi (Mawokota South), Simeo Nsubuga (Kassanda South), former FDC treasurer Anita Among (Bukedea Woman), Arinaitwe Rwakajara (Workers), Peter Ogwang (Usuk) and Jacob Oboth-Oboth (West Budama South).

Asked about the Constitution (Amendment) Bill, Rwakajara told The Observer on Saturday that he will support it when it comes to parliament.

"Let it come to parliament and we see the details. I will support it," Rwakajara said.

Yet any attempt to lift the age-limit will most likely set off protests from some sections of the public, opposition groups and civil society activists.

Godber Tumushabe, the executive director of the Great Lakes Institute for Strategic Studies (GLISS), told NYUMABANI on Saturday that government's insistence on pushing forward with the amendment shows they don't have the interests of citizens at heart.

"This government no longer works for the people. It works for itself and President Museveni. What Museveni wants is what becomes law," Tumushabe said.

Betty Nambooze, the Mukono municipality legislator, told NYUMBANI last week that the opposition would rise up against any attempt to lift the presidential age-limit.

"I call upon all well-meaning Ugandans to join us in the struggle against dictatorship. We shall not sit by and watch as Museveni tampers with the Constitution."

Uganda civil servants face strict dress code

Public servants in Uganda are facing a strict dress code after the government issued a circular warning them to "dress decently".

Female staff have been told not to show any cleavage, wear brightly coloured nails, braids or hair extensions, sleeveless or transparent blouses.
Men must wear long-sleeved shirts, jackets and ties, while trousers should not be tight-fitting.
Staff failing to comply will be disciplined.
The guidelines, issued by the Ministry of Public Service apply to all non-uniformed civil servants. But there is a feeling that female staff are the main focus on the new rules.
While women will be allowed to wear pant-suits, they have been warned not to wear any tight-fitting clothing. Dresses and skirts must at least be knee-length.
Uganda is a conservative society and women have previously complained of being harassed if they wear mini-skirts in public.

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How to 'dress decently' in Uganda:

Female officers

• To dress in a skirt or dress that is not above the knees, with a smart long or short sleeved blouse. Officers should avoid wearing sleeveless, transparent blouses and dresses at the work place.
• To ensure that the clothing covers up cleavage, navel, knees and back.
• Not allowed to have bright coloured hair in form of natural hair, braids and hair extensions.
• Maintain well-groomed, neutral polished nails. Long nails with more than 3cms (1.5in), with bright nail polish or with multi-coloured nail polish are not allowed in public offices.
• Shall keep the facial make-up simple and not exaggerated.

Male officers

• Male officers are required to dress in neat trousers, long-sleeved shirts, jacket and a tie.
• Officers will not be allowed to put on open shoes during working hours, except on health grounds/recommendation.
• Hair should be well-groomed and generally kept short.
• Tight fitting trousers will not be permitted.

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The Ministry of Public Service's director of Human Resources, Adah Muwanga, said they had to act after receiving complaints:
"We were approached with complaints that, specifically lady officers, were dressing in an unacceptable manner, with mini-skirts and showing body parts which otherwise generally should be covered in Ugandan society," she told the BBC.
She said the ministry has overall responsibility to guide on the administration and management of the public service and "this is how we want the public to view us".
The circular further states that accessories should be modest, while long fingernails of more than 3cms (1.5in) with bright or multi-coloured nail polish are also not permitted.
Flat, open shoes are ruled out, except in cases where one can prove that it is for medical reasons.
Men have been told they should keep their hair short and neat, and not wear brightly coloured clothes.
The circular is derived from Public Service Standing Orders on dress code, put in place in 2010.
However, the BBC's Patience Atuhaire in Kampala says the dress code does not seem to have been paid much attention to up to now.
Mrs Muwanga said that staff who failed to comply with the new enforcements would be cautioned at first, and repeat offenders would face disciplinary action.
However she added "there is always room for review".

 

 

 

 

 

White House Pushes Military Might Over Humanitarian Aid in Africa

 

 

MUA MISSION, Malawi — If ever there was an example of American and African military bonhomie, it was at a recent summit meeting here over glasses of South African Pinotage and expectations of Pentagon largess.

Gen. Daniel B. Allyn, vice chief of staff of the United States Army, gave the African generals advice from his days in Haiti after the 2010 earthquake. Maj. Gen. Joseph P. Harrington, the head of United States Army Africa, gave a shout-out to the West African military leaders who helped prod the former Gambian president, Yahya Jammeh, out of office after he lost his bid for re-election last year. Lt. Gen. Robert Kariuki Kibochi, the commander of the Kenyan Army, got understanding nods from the Americans when he made clear how much blood African peacekeepers put on the line.

But even here, among men who have been given every reason to expect that they will be receiving more money from the Trump administration, there is unease that the additional American heft may come at a steep price. Pentagon officials are themselves concerned that shifting to a military-heavy presence in Africa will hurt American interests in the long term by failing to stimulate development. An absence of schools and jobs, they say, creates more openings for militant groups.

“We have statements out of Washington about significant reductions in foreign aid,” Gen. Griffin Phiri, the commander of the Malawi Defense Forces, said in an interview during the African Land Forces Summit, a conference of 126 American Army officers and service members and their counterparts from 40 African nations. “What I can tell you is that experience has shown us that diplomacy and security must come together.” He bemoaned “mixed messages” coming out of Washington.

Actually, the message is not so mixed, foreign policy experts say. If Congress passes Mr. Trump’s proposed Pentagon budget for the 2018 fiscal year — it calls for an additional $52 billion on top of the current $575 billion base budget — the United States will spend more money on military affairs in Africa but reduce humanitarian and development assistance across the continent. The Trump budget proposes cutting aid to Africa to $5.2 billion in the 2018 fiscal year from $8 billion now, a stark drop. Even some of the money still in the Trump proposal would shift to security areas from humanitarian and development, foreign policy experts say.

“We are radically narrowing the definition of why and how Africa matters to U.S. national interests,” said J. Stephen Morrison, senior vice president at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Gone are the days, he said, when human rights, development, economic growth and humanitarian relief dominated the American agenda on the continent.

The Pentagon has not yet specified how much money will go to African militaries, but officials say there will be more of it for training programs, joint exercises and counterterrorism efforts. There may also be more funding for Camp Lemonnier, the American base in Djibouti, where visitors are greeted with a video of American and East African troops parachuting out of planes and rolling on the dirt together, to the screaming howls of AC/DC’s “Thunderstruck.”

The Trump administration has proposed slashing programs that buy antiretroviral drugs for people who are infected with H.I.V., the virus that causes AIDS, by at least $1.1 billion — nearly a fifth of their current funding. Researchers say the cuts could lead to the deaths of at least one million people in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere. Over all, Mr. Trump’s budget submission would reduce State Department funding by roughly a third and cut foreign assistance by about 29 percent.

Mr. Trump’s proposal would also move away from traditional development assistance programs in favor of so-called Economic Support Funds, short-term investments based on national security calculations.

The White House has yet to nominate someone for the post of assistant secretary of state for African affairs — the top administration envoy to the continent. Mr. Trump has made only a handful of calls to African leaders since taking office, and the National Security Council still doesn’t have a director for African affairs.

Mr. Trump’s secretary of state, Rex W. Tillerson, reinforced the view on the continent that the Trump administration puts a low priority on diplomacy when in April he backed out of a planned meeting with the chairman of the African Union, Moussa Faki Mahamat, at the last minute. The aborted meeting, first reported by Foreign Policy magazine, left the chairman fuming.

In addition, two big think tanks, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the United States Institute of Peace, are facing the complete elimination of federal funding for their Africa programs under Mr. Trump’s proposed budget.

And yet over at the Pentagon, it is a different story. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis wasn’t on the job three months before he took his first trip to the continent, arriving in Djibouti on a bright Sunday in April for meetings with President Ismail Omar Guelleh. In Chad in March, American Special Forces were conducting training exercises with service members from 20 African countries.

Last month, Gen. Thomas Waldhauser, the head of the Pentagon’s Africa Command, was in Tripoli, Libya, in the first high-level visit by an American official since the 2012 attacks on the American Consulate in Benghazi. General Waldhauser huddled with Fayez Serraj, the leader of Libya’s new government of national accord, as the Defense Department — now the lead agency for diplomacy in Africa — wrestled with the idea of how to reach a political solution to the chaos in Libya.

And at the African Land Forces Summit in Malawi, held over two days in May, the American military spent $1.2 million flying in and housing African military leaders. The Americans hired buses to take the African commanders to their hotels and brought in National Guard and reserve officers from all over the United States to chat with their counterparts.

The American military leaders are among the first to sound alarms about the proposed cuts in humanitarian funding, worrying that the reductions could put in place conditions that lead to more conflict, which might then mean more military intervention.

In testimony submitted to the Senate Armed Services Committee this month, a long list of retired American military officers, including Gen. Stanley McChrystal, Gen. David H. Petraeus and Adm. Michael Mullen, said foreign aid cuts hurt the Pentagon. “We are part of a long history of U.S. military leaders who have noted how much more cost-effective it is to prevent a conflict than to end one,” the officers wrote.

Or as Mr. Mattis told Congress in 2013, when he was a general overseeing American military operations in the Middle East as head of United States Central Command, “If you don’t fully fund the State Department, then I need to buy more ammunition.’’

Military leaders today echo Mr. Mattis’s sentiment.

“We recognize the limits of military power, and how important it is to leverage all elements and capabilities that our interagency and nongovernmental organizations bring to bear in Africa and around the world,” General Harrington told the opening session of the conference in Malawi.

Gen. Carter Ham, a former commander of Africa Command, said in an interview that cuts in foreign aid would lead to the need for more increases in military spending. “Insecurity in Africa, which adversely affects the United States, stems in my view from loss of hope,” he said.

He offered an example: “If you’re a young Muslim man in northeastern Nigeria, and you look at your government and say, my prospects for a job are pretty slim, there’s no education or health care, and then suddenly some guy comes along and offers me money, prestige, a gun and a girl, a purpose, that becomes attractive,” he said, referring to the many young men who have been coaxed into joining the militant group Boko Haram.

On the closing day of the African Land Forces Summit, the assembled African generals listened intently as one American diplomat posed a central question.

“How do we operate in an environment when we are willing to send peacekeepers,” asked Alexander M. Laskaris, a State Department official with Africa Command, “but we’re not willing to take the steps necessary to make peace?”

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/25/world/africa/white-house-pushes-military-might-over-humanitarian-aid 

       CONGO,A TICKING TIME BOMB 

Kabila is flexing. Kasai is unraveling. Angola is smouldering. 

There’s a great deal of uncertainty in Kinshasa. Credit:Issa Ahmed Khamis

The week before US President Donald Trump’s inauguration this January was an interesting time to be in the capital Kinshasa. The Democratic Republic of Congo‘s regime was in a peculiar mindset.
As they looked over to the US, officials recalled that Patrice Lumumba, DRC’s first freely-elected prime minister, was assassinated just a few days before the inauguration of John F. Kennedy in 1961. They also pointed out that President Laurent-Désiré Kabila was killed less than a week before George W. Bush first took office in 2001.
Some of those around the current president were convinced history would repeat − that there would be an attempt on Joseph Kabila’s life in the run-up to Trump’s inauguration. They claimed there was a conspiracy by the international community to atomise the Congo and neutralise Kabila like they had Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi.

What didn’t happen next

This assassination attempt never happened. And since that January, many more things have not happened.
Foremost among them is the implementation of the Saint Sylvester Agreement. This is the deal that was settled between the government and opposition on 31 December 2016. Made nearly two weeks after the official end of President Kabila’s second mandated term, the agreement ostensibly offers a roadmap out of the Congo’s political and constitutional crisis.
Facilitated by the Conference of Catholic Bishops, the agreement contains a commitment to respect the Constitution. It also includes several references to the fact that Kabila, who has been in office since 2001, will not stand for a third term. Instead, it says he will lead a transition government and hand over to a successor to be elected by the end of 2017.
On the one hand, the Saint Sylvester Agreement was an important achievement with consensus and concessions from all sides. There had been widespread protests through 2016, leading to dozens of deaths, and the deal allowed a period of fragile calm. It was also the result of a fully Congolese process, mediated by perhaps the last national institution to retain a degree of moral authority.
But on the other hand, it remains a vulnerable construct. The deal has several blind spots and gaps to be filled in through later negotiations. It was agreed between a divided ruling coalition and divided opposition. And it was made in a country with a long tradition of people signing deals without intending to respect them.

As a source within the regime said: “This agreement has the great merit of being unrealistic. It will be hard to implement. We will let the government led by the opposition govern and organise the elections. They will conclude soon enough that it is unfeasible to organise them before the end of the year, and when they pass their deadline, we will whistle at them as they whistled at us last December.”

Since the agreement, the government has consistently demonstrated its lack of will to organise elections. This was seen, amongst other occasions, as it exploited the predictable implosion of the opposition UDPS after the death of its leader Etienne Tshisekedi this February.

But the opposition has hardly impressed either. The only activity to see progress is voter registration, and many believe this is because the regime is preparing for a constitutional referendum to propose removing the two-term presidential limit.

Local violence out of control

Away from Kinshasa, things are also increasingly uncertain as local conflicts have intensified in certain areas these past months.
The most dramatic developments have been in Kasai. Until recently, this region did not know the phenomenon of armed groups. But in August 2016, conflict was triggered by a succession dispute among customary authorities about 70 km from the city of Kananga.
The governor of Kasai Central tried to appoint someone against the will of the community. There were violent incidents in which the locally supported candidate was killed. And eventually a new armed movement called Kamwina Nsapu emerged.
Violence regularly flared up for the rest of 2016. It became permanent in January 2017. And it grew exponentially in February. The uprising, which started locally, spread across several provinces and was met with excessive violence.
Up to now, at least 42 mass graves have been discovered in the region. Meanwhile, two members of the UN Group of Experts − who were investigating human rights abuses and ties between the violence, national politics and the Congolese army − were found dead this March.
The case of Kasai shows how the Congolese state has lost its capacity to anticipate or even react to local conflicts. It exemplifies how areas get stuck between a formal administration that exists on paper but is not operational on the one hand, and customary authorities which often lack consensus and legitimacy and thus are vulnerable for manipulation on the other.
These tensions led to the massive violence in the Kasai and could happen in many other places in Congo where the same conditions apply.

International anxiety

At an international level, the Congo is also in flux. This can be seen in particular when it comes to Angola.
From the beginning of the Kabila family’s reign, its southern neighbour has been one of the regime’s most important partners. Both Laurent-Désiré and Joseph Kabila have been saved on various occasions by Angola.
The president considers this crucial support to be an expression of solidarity with his regime or even with him personally.  But the reality is that Angola’s absolute priority is, and always has been, to avoid instability along its 2,500 km border with the DRC.
In the last months of 2016, Angola sent clear messages to Kabila to respect the Constitution and organise a transition within a reasonable time-frame. This position seems to be supported by the southern Africa regional bloc SADC as a whole. The region does not believe Kabila is able to provide stability and does not want the vast country to implode.
As the situation has worsened in 2017, Angola has not been amused by the lack of progress in the political process and even less by the 1.3 million displaced people in Kasai, which it borders. Many in Congo, including inside the regime, fear that Angola might take action to maximise pressure on Kabila.

 

Predicting the unpredictable

The result of all these dynamics − from the national-level impasse, to spreading local level conflicts, to increasingly anxious neighbours − is that nobody knows what to expect. It is no longer possible to predict what will happen in the Congo.
On the one hand, the regime radiates self-confidence and believes it can impose a referendum. Kabila seemed to confirm this in his interview with Der Spiegel, in which he commented: “To change the constitution is constitutional…You can change the constitution by referendum.”
But on the other hand, the president and his entourage know they are unpopular and that they can only win the referendum with fraud and/or intimidation. In a survey last year, 81.4% of respondents said they were against changing the constitution. Kabila’s government is also aware that its ability to control local conflicts is weak.
One of the key questions at the moment is of what effect the Western sanctions imposed on various senior officials in the last couple of weeks will have. Will they further undermine the cohesion of the regime? Or will they allow the government to close ranks and even win back a part of public opinion through a militant nationalist discourse?
As is becoming increasingly the case when it comes to the Congo, this too is nigh on impossible to predict.
Kris Berwouts’ new book Congo’s Violent Peace: Conflict and Struggle Since the Great African War is out in July 2017. It will be published as part of the African Arguments book series by ZED Books. It will be launched on 3 July. This article is drew on research Kris conducted for DfID’s DRC Evidence, Analysis and Coordination Programme (EACP), on behalf of Integrity Research and Consultancy.

Montreal: the latest hotspot for Africa’s rulers to keep their wealth?

A new African Arguments investigation has found that politically-exposed African nationals hold Canadian real estate worth several millions of dollars.
The study, conducted in partnership with the Journal de Montréal and Le Monde Afrique, reveals over a dozen individuals who have invested nearly $26 million in Canadian real estate, often without a mortgage.
The source of the funds used to buy these properties could be legitimate. But the sales should have raised red flags because of the public positions of the individuals involved or because of their association with deals that have raised suspicion.
Buying bricks and mortar abroad has long been a strategy of the rich to diversify their assets.
Typically, the likes of France, US and UK have been the go-to places to buy up expensive property. Not all of it uses clean money. In 2016, a UK parliamentary committee estimated that a shocking $150 billion is laundered in London’s real estate market every year. But in recent years, luxurious flats owned by families of African leaders have been seized in each of these countries.
This seems to have led some to look further afield.
“They will diversify their investments according to only one criteria, which is the legal security offered by specific territories,” says William Bourdon, lawyer for Sherpa.
Sherpa is the NGO behind the “ill-gotten gains” case in France in which the rulers of Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville and Equatorial Guinea stand accused of laundering money in luxurious French properties.
According to Marc Guéniat, a researcher at the Swiss NGO Public Eye, France has historically been the favoured location for investment amongst the rulers of francophone Africa, but incidences such as the “ill-gotten gains” case have changed this.
“Logically, these rulers look for other destinations,” he says.  “As a francophone region, Québec is an interesting alternative.”
In Québec, the origins of funds invested in real estate don’t seem to raise too many questions. A recent Transparency International report highlighted the country’s weak anti-money laundering regulations in the real estate sector.
In theory, both real estate brokers and financial entities such as banks are responsible for detecting money laundering in Canada. They are meant to notify suspicious transactions to the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) that can, in turn, inform the police.
But between 2003 and 2013, in which there were over 5 million real estate sales, FINTRAC received just 279 suspicious transactions warnings. This rate increased slightly following educational efforts by FINTRAC, although it remains relatively low.
Moreover, in the dozen administrative penalties that FINTRAC has levied against brokers who failed to properly identify clients since 2008, the fines have averaged under $6,900. This pales in comparison to sales sometimes worth millions of dollars.
Brokers that fail to meet their legal responsibilities also face criminal sanctions, but it is not clear how many such cases have been investigated and brought to justice. The Canadian royal police did not reply to our questions.

 

 

Congo-Brazzaville

Wilfrid Nguesso is the nephew of Denis Sassou-Nguesso, the president of Congo-Brazzaville who has held an often violent grip on power for a total of 32 years. Over the past decade, Wilfrid has been trying to migrate to Montreal, but the Canadian authorities have forbidden him entry on the grounds that he allegedly belongs to a “criminal organisation” that has embezzled Congo’s public funds.
Wilfrid and his wife bought a house in Montreal worth over $730,000 without a mortgage in 2007. He did not reply to our calls for comments.
Voltaire Brice Etou Obami is an accountant and businessman close to the Nguesso family. He is named in a note by the French anti-laundering agency, Tracfin, due to his business deals with Catherine Ignanga. Ignanga used to be President Sassou-Nguesso’s sister-in-law and is being investigated by Tracfin. Obami is not under investigation and told us that he does not know about Ignanga’s dealings that are being scrutinised.
In 2014, Obami invested over $410,000 in two Montreal hotel rooms. His children study in Canada and he says he has applied for an immigration visa. According to him, the funds for the rooms came from his wife, who he says made profits from the real estate industry in Africa.
Jean Jacques Bouya is a member of Congo’s presidential family. He is being investigated by Tracfin. In Congo, he oversees millions of dollars in public funds as the Minister of Spatial Planning and Major Projects. He was previously chief of the agency in charge of large public works, the DGGT (Délégation générale des grands travaux).
According to a document from the French financial fraud police that we procured, the DGGT under Bouya made several transfers to bank accounts in San Marino between 2007 and 2013. All these accounts were held by Philippe Chironi, a close associate of Congo’s ruling family. The transfers came to a total of close to $75 million “whose origin could be illicit”, according to the document. These funds were transferred to accounts held by several people, including Bouya and Catherine Ignanga.
In 2008 and 2009, Bouya bought two buildings in Québec for a total of close to $1.3 million without a mortgage. He did not return our calls for comment.
Tite Kaba is a Congolese civil servant. He was in charge of land titles until 2016 when he was accused of producing a false deed for the benefit of an individual close to the Nguesso family.
Kaba and his wife, Rachida Kaba, have invested over $4.2 million in Quebec’s real estate since 2008 (in several cases, with a mortgage). They refused to reply to our questions regarding the origin of the funds.

Chad

Ibrahim Hissein Bourma is married to the sister of Hinda Déby. Hinda is the wife of Idriss Déby, Chad’s president since 1990. The main client of Bourma’s profitable import-export company, Oum-Alkheri General Trading, is the Chadian government.
In 2013, Bourma was stopped in Egypt with over $200,000 hidden in a secret compartment of his suitcase. He was later acquitted on a technicality after an intervention from the Chadian embassy. His lawyer told us he was acquitted in 2015 and that the affair was an unfortunate “imbroglio”.
In Canada, Bourma bought properties worth over $4.9 million without a mortgage between 2012 and 2016 through his company Investissement Siham Canada Inc. He told us: “I come from a family of businessmen, so I can only succeed.” On why he likes to invest in Québec, he said: “In Dubai, you can buy flats and the price drops very fast. In Montreal, it has been stable for years…If you see the number of apartments that I bought, it’s clearly for investment.”
Bourma’s brother, Mahamat Zene Isseine Bourma, is married to President Déby’s daughter. He bought a flat in Montreal for about $490,000 in 2013 without a mortgage. The previous year, he was appointed Chad’s paymaster general by Déby and tasked with overseeing all government spending. At this time, his company won large public contracts such as supplying ambulances to the Ministry of Health. In 2016, he was fired from the job after accusations of embezzlement. He told us these allegations were without basis. “The story was proven wrong…they’ve invented quite a few things,” he said.
The sister of the two Bourmas, Amina Hissein Bourma and her husband, Mahamat Kasser Younous, bought a flat worth $340,000 in Québec in 2012. The following year, they purchased a villa worth $840,000, both without a mortgage. At the time of the purchases, Younous was director of Chad’s national oil company. They did not return our calls.

Cameroon

Jacques Ndjamba Mbeleck is a consultant who founded the Cameroonian accounting company, CAC, which is very active in Chad’s oil sector. He also told us he is good friends with Mahamat Bourma.
In 2011, Mbeleck’s firm was advising Chad’s government. In this time, it received a $7.4 million bonus payment directly from the oil company Griffiths Energy International. An independent auditor looking into Chad’s extractive revenues described this transaction as “against best practice”. Griffiths had just won oil rights in Chad. A couple of years later, this deal raised controversy as Griffiths admitted to bribing Chad’s ambassador to Canada and his deputy to obtain the permits. No accusations of corruption have been levied against CAC. Ndjamba Mbeleck told us that the $7.4 million payment was above board.
In 2012, Mbeleck bought a flat in Montreal worth around $420,000, with a mortgage. He bought another property worth $580,000 the following year, without a mortgage.

Gabon

 

 

Zéphyrin Rayita is a senator who has held high-ranking positions in Gabon’s telecommunications sector. Lin Mombo is a civil servant who has worked in the same industry. Mombo is also the partner of Marie-Madeleine Mborantsuo (aka “3M”), the powerful president of Gabon’s constitutional court, which ruled in favour of President Ali Bongo after the controversial elections last year. In March, RFI and the Canard Enchainé revealed that Mborantsuo is under an investigation by French authorities for allegedly embezzling public funds and money laundering.
In 2003, Rayita and Mombo bought a two-story building in Montreal for $2.2 million with a mortgage covering half the amount. They sold it four years later. Reached over the phone, Mborantsuo said “you think that’s how you’ll be able to ask me questions? Do you think it’s really normal that you call to tell me you’ll ask me questions?” She then hung up and didn’t reply to our subsequent messages.
We did not manage to reach Rayita. Mombo told us that state officials in Gabon are well paid and that he decided to invest his salary in real estate.
Joël Bernard Ogouma is the Inspector General of Taxation in Gabon, a country whose ruling family is targeted by the ill-gotten gains case in France. Ogouma himself has not been accused of corruption as far as we know. In Québec, Ogouma bought a flat for over $510,000 in 2014, without a mortgage. He did not respond to our calls for comment.

Senegal

 

 

Mamadou Pouye is a close associate of Karim Wade. Karim is the son of Abdoulaye Wade, Senegal’s president from 2000 to 2012. Under his father’s government, Karim held a number of high-level positions and gained the nickname “Mr 15%” in reference to the personal cut he allegedly took from public tenders. During that period, Pouye set up companies abroad, including in Panama, as was revealed in the Panama Papers leak.
After his father lost power, Karim Wade was arrested together with Pouye. Karim was sentenced to six years in jail for embezzlement, but released by a presidential pardon in 2016 after serving just three.
In the case, the prosecution alleged that Pouye had “helped or assisted” Karim “in the preparation, facilitation or undertaking of illicit enrichment”. Pouye was convicted in 2015 and released on bail the following year. France and the United Nations criticised the trial’s fairness. Pouye’s lawyer claimed to us that his client is innocent.
In Montreal, Pouye bought a flat in 2012 for over $460,000 via a company registered in Canada named 9259-7087 QUÉBEC INC.
Madiké Niang was Karim Wade’s lawyer during his trial. Previously, he occupied key ministerial positions in Adboulaye Wade’s government. He was also reportedly targeted in the investigation into Wade and Pouye but was never formally accused.
In 2006, Niang bought a flat in Montréal for about $225,000 and another one in 2008 for about $270,000 with a mortgage. He did not return our calls.

Algeria

 

 

Réda Bedjaoui is the brother of Farid Bedjaoui. Farid has been accused of channelling millions of dollars in bribes for an Algerian oil deal and is on Interpol’s wanted list. Over the years, Farid has given Réda at least several hundreds of thousands of dollars. Réda is not under investigation as far as we know. Réda Bedjaoui has bought two properties worth a total of $4.7 million in Montreal and several others with his ex-wife. He did not respond to our requests for comment.
A third brother, Ryad Bedjaoui, has bought land worth $3.6 million in Montréal with a company whose majority shareholder was Farid Bedjaoui. He sold the land four years later. His lawyer told us that Ryad has “no financial relation with his brothers”.

Uganda: Museveni’s routes to staying in power beyond 2021

it wouldn’t be a surprise to see President Museveni, or immediate family, stay in power past 2021. The question is how.

President Yoweri Museveni being inaugurated in 2016, 30 years after he first came to power

Yoweri Kaguta Museveni was confirmed as the winner of Uganda’s presidential election for a fifth consecutive time on 20 February 2016. However, if the president is to stay in office beyond the next set of elections in 2021 he will have to overcome a constitutional impediment. Article 102 (b) of Uganda’s 1995 Constitution states that “a person is not qualified for election as President unless that person is not less than thirty-five years and not more than seventy-five years of age”.

President Museveni will be 76 in 2021. But in the last year, Museveni, indirectly and from a distance, has been testing out strategies to either keep himself in power or anoint a successor.

Born again?

In December 2016, Justice Steven Kavuma, Uganda’s second most senior judge was rumoured – though this has been denied by Uganda’s judicial authorities – to have sworn an affidavit that he was in fact four years younger than his official age. At 69, Kavuma appeared to have found a new lease of life just as his retirement age of 70 loomed. His announcement drew much hilarity on Ugandan social media, but was there an ulterior motive for his actions?

Kavuma, a founding member of the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM), served as State Minister for Defence in the early 2000s and was described as “hugely partisan” by a former Supreme Court judge. The process behind his appointment as Deputy Chief Justice in 2015 was challenged in the courts. “There is no doubt he enjoys the confidence of Museveni”, Nicholas Opiyo, a Kampala-based political analyst and human rights lawyer, told ARI.

Could he therefore have been testing the water for the president? Museveni’s official birthday is 15 September 1944 but given his well-documented upbringing to rural, illiterate parents, the date was estimated by reference to local historical events. Museveni only needs to be one year younger to stand again in 2021.

The idea of altering one’s age is not as surprising as it might sound according to Opiyo, who notes that “the practice is commonplace among civil servants who do not want to retire upon clocking up their mandatory retirement age”. This point is reinforced by a letter dated 6 February 2017 from the Ministry of Public Service (MPS), which indicated that “many requests” had been made by officers to change their dates of birth, particularly those coming up to retirement.

For now, the MPS has been clear that the dates declared at the time of initial appointment will be used, but Museveni will undoubtedly be watching what unfolds with interest.

A repeat performance

Elsewhere, the wheels are already in motion for a tried and tested approach. In August 2016, a private member’s bill was presented to parliament by NRM MP Robert Ssekitooleko. The bill, which was subsequently thrown out by the speaker, Rebecca Kadaga, without being debated, proposed raising retirement ages for judges and life tenures for members of the electoral commission.

“It was widely, and correctly, perceived as a first step towards undermining and eventually amending Article 102 (b) of the Constitution to remove the presidential age limit”, wrote Dr Busingye Kabumba, a constitutional law expert at Makerere University, though Ssekitooleko denies this.

Uganda has history of such shenanigans. After the presidential elections in 2001, Museveni faced a constitutional impediment to re-election: the country’s two-term presidential limit. A sustained and successful parliamentary push for constitutional reform ensued. Museveni consistently distanced himself publicly from this campaign, but was widely considered to be directing it behind the scenes. The removal of term-limits was passed by parliament in 2005 alongside the reintroduction of multi-party politics.

In Uganda’s 10th parliament, the ruling party has the two-thirds majority – excluding NRM-leaning independents – required for constitutional amendments. Even outspoken critics, like Rebecca Kadaga, are unlikely to oppose what Museveni wants. According to  Opiyo, “she is combative on soft issues, and for the purpose of raising her political capital when it benefits her, but in matters crucial to the president, she has always given in”. A trade-off that sees the removal of age limits coupled with the reintroduction of term limits (with Museveni starting afresh) is a possible approach, and one that would deflect some criticism at home and abroad.

A family affair

The removal of age limits might not be the only change to Uganda’s political system ahead of elections in 2021. With the NRM so dominant in the legislature – the main opposition Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) holds less than 10% of seats – Uganda might look to move towards a new democratic model.

“I expect the next move for the NRM will be to immunise the presidency from adult suffrage and make ascendancy to the position the choice of parliament,” political analyst Angelo Izama told ARI. If this succeeded, the NRM would all but guarantee that its chosen candidate would be the president and remove any risk of losing out in presidential polls, which historically have produced closer results than those at the parliamentary level.

Museveni would still require a resolution to his age-limit conundrum if he wants to remain in charge, but a system where the president is indirectly elected could also open the door further to family succession.

A handover of power from Museveni to his son Muhoozi Kainerugaba has long been mooted in Ugandan political circles. Talk of the “Muhoozi project” was revived in mid-January 2017 by a reshuffle in the defence sector that saw several senior “historicals” replaced by military officers of Kainerugaba’s generation. This included the president’s son going from being the head of Special Forces Command to State House, where he will serve as a special presidential advisor for special operations – a move that suggests Muhoozi is being prepared for the political and administrative rigours of the presidency.

Anna Reuss, a Kampala-based political and security analyst, does not believe there is a fixed plan, but acknowledges that “without doubt he [Museveni] is positioning his son, and other family members, in anticipation of a possible succession”.

If not his son, could Museveni’s wife be the next president? Izama believes so. “Janet Museveni is second to her husband when it comes to political experience, has served as a two-term MP, and is a long-serving member of the cabinet. She is also a force in the NRM party and instrumental in state-business relations”, he says. If the system is changed before 2021, “a more direct and less controversial route will open for Janet Museveni”.

By keeping the presidency within the family, Museveni would also be able to maintain a degree of control, and use his patronage networks even if he were officially out of office.

How, not if

Museveni has not publically commented on his future but a close look at the political manoeuvrings since his re-election in 2016, and even before, indicate that he is already trying to find a way to extend his time at the helm into a fourth decade. “Many will not support another term”, says social media commentator Grace Natabaalo, but at the same time the majority of Ugandans will not be surprised to see Museveni, or an immediate family member, confirmed as president in 2021. The more pertinent question, and the one to watch, is how they go about getting there.

UGANDA'S IGP KALE KAYIHURA THREATENS JOURNALIST

A Renown investigative journalist, manager and editor of the  online news site the ‘INVESTIGATOR’ Ndawula Stanley has called upon President Museveni over death threats to him and his family by police chief Kale Kayihura.

Below is a later from a journalist to Museveni about an impending criminal activity on a reporter.

Your Excellency, please accept my apology in advance to reach you through this means of communication. As the fountain of honor, I am well aware of competing national demands, its’ not possible to gain private access to you, hence the reference as above.

I’m a writer; reporter aged 45 years, to this end, the CEO at the Investigator Publications (U) Limited running an online newspaper www.theinvestigatornews.com, my meaningful and gainful living. Over the last two decades, I have practiced journalism without any glitches. Hence my concern about recent episodes on the Late Wilberforce Wamala and AIGP A.F Kaweesi, for unclear and unknown reasons I started encountering serious life threats from police operatives and the Inspector General of Police, Gen. Edward Kale Kayihura.

The Genesis

Your Excellency, specifically, from March 20th 2017, I started receiving terrifying telephone calls and subtle messages through parties unknown to me concerned security and police sources. The aggregate were warnings to me to watch my back because of the salient information I share in the court of public opinion had clues on who committed the brutal offence. More ominous is that an action of last resort to stop me may be at best a kidnap, and worse to torture me into a vegetated state. As a loyal citizen, I am simply following Your Excellency’s open outcry of criminal infiltration in police. To this end our editorial team resolved to run supportive investigative stories, pointing out the rot and where possible, name and shame the culprits, which would be helpful to IGP to ‘clean his house.’

Those I have privately shared with the above predicaments advised that I appeal to the court of public opinion. I followed this hunch and made the alarm on social media platforms. I admit here that the investigator runs the series code-named ‘CIP Records’ (Crime Infiltrated Police Records). Along the way, the newspaper published a laundry-list of Gen. Kayihura’s most trusted operatives, namely SSP Nickson Karuhanga Agasirwe and SPC Hajji Abdu Ssemuju aka Minaana’s criminal records. Both of them have murder files written to their names and they were the very people at the center of Kaweesi’s murder investigations. Further to this was a report that the duo had arrested and presented ‘fake suspects,’ who, suggestively, had no idea of the location of the scene of crime in Kulambiro. The Advisory Columns too pointed at how best police can clean their image.

On the evening of April 8th 2017, I had received a telephone call from one Charles Etukuri, a journalist with New Vision and, ostensibly, Gen. Kale Kayihura’s social media Platforms’ Manager. This caller wanted to meet me. At my prompting he gave me a hint on the meeting agenda as sent by the IGP Gen. Kayihura. The following day, I requested two personal confidants one from Okello House and another from OPM to join me for the evening mchomo to witness a journalist being used to frustrate fellow journalists’ professional works. Indeed, Etukuri came and told me the IGP wanted to talk to me over the ‘negative’ stories about police. I told Etukuri that the IGP should summon me to his office but through his assistants or PRO’s office, but not through journalists. He further informed me that even the First Son, Gen. Muhoozi Kainerugaba was bitter with me. He warned that I stop the series or I will be stopped.

The following day, the same caller, insisting that we travel to Jinja where, the IGP was to see me. I reiterated that I had no intention of meeting the IGP but in case he wanted to see me, there are channels through which he could use to see me, like officially summon me to his office. The threatening retort was I quote ‘If you can’t look for the IGP, he will look for you and you wouldn’t like the idea’. Noticeably, I started seeing trailers on my foot prints including friendly insider telephone calls from police and security operatives as well as crime journalists, advising me to switch places. The civil but yet more overt action is the recently secured interim court order from Court by the IGP stopping me from publishing stories about Kaweesi murder investigations.

On Saturday 22nd 2017, I received two calls. One was advising me to stay indoors and another warned me to momentarily leave the city. Both callers told me that Col. Atwoki Ndahura of Crime Intelligence had succumbed to the IGP’s pressure to have me kidnapped. Tired and angry, I called Col. Ndahura who only picked on the third attempt. I asked him where they wanted me to report instead of tracking me with the use of arguably crime-laced operatives. He first denied knowledge of the development but I insisted with facts. He opened up and said I had become a stress to the IGP and the police work in general. I told him that the methods they were using only fitted the times of the fallen regime of Idi Amin. He promised to talk to the General whom he described as ‘very bitter and stressed.’

That same day, I had an appointment with a musician, Joseph Mayanja aka Jose Chameleon at Lubowa-based Quality Supermarket. While there, a detective attached to Crime Intelligence came first and took position at a nearby restaurant. Shortly afterwards, Chameleon came with his kids and a young man whom I know very well, is a police informer. Joseph explained how he wanted the Investigator to help him ran campaigns of his forthcoming concert. To say the least, I was shocked that he had called me over such a minor issue. He knows who handles that docket and they are friends. Even more shocking, was the telephone call I received from a friend from security circles, he advised me to escape, “you are just 10 minutes away from being kidnapped.” I confronted Jose Chameleon but he denied having any knowledge of the same. On my insistence, a fidgety and nervous Joseph evacuated me in his car. When we reached Entebbe Road, there was heavy traffic. At the end of my tethers, I jumped ship onto a boda-boda which helped me to flee towards the direction of Entebbe.

At Kajjansi, I called my friend who drove me up to Busega through the under-construction Entebbe Express Highway. My security situation was deteriorating under my very eyes. I had earlier talked to CMI Boss Col. Abel Kanduho who openly told me he couldn’t help. I had also reached out unsuccessfully to Security Minister Gen. Henry Tumukunde’s assistants, and Your Excellency’s personnel. Efforts to reach Gen. Salim Saleh were also futile. I was advised that either I seek your attention and or think of leaving the country. I know of many Journalists who have left Uganda because of similar life threats but I am not about to jump ship.

Why Gen. Kayihura?

After the above Lubowa incident, I was embittered and, around midnight in frustration, I called Col. Ndahura again. He listened to me for about 40 minutes as I lamented my ordeal. He sounded touched. “Ndugu Stanley, hariwo ekintu kigumire munonga. I’m also concerned.” Col Ndahura promised to call me the following day. On Monday, a one Wilson Nkeiza (whom my sources tell me is Moses Tandeka) called me. He asked to meet me on Col. Ndahura’s advice. That afternoon, we met at a restaurant near Bank of Africa in Ntinda. He asked what I wanted from Gen. Kayihura and I told him, my freedom is what I wanted.

Kayihura
I am now a fugitive in my own home and country at the behest of the IGP, supposedly, a public protector. Adding, I may know of his personal deeds but the newspaper is not concerned and or interested in sharing those in the court of public opinion. Furthermore, it is a duty or a calling to help and support the fountain of honour on this matter of cleaning the rot within the police, as a public protector. Moreover, the newspaper has illuminated scenarios where, the police failed in the investigations. Col Ndahura and Nkeiza, concurred, arguably, that I had no problem but the General. They promised to plead and ‘calm’ him down.

On Tuesday 25th April 2017, Wilson Nkeiza called me and asked me to call Col. Ndahura. The Colonel told me that he was happy for me – Reason? “I have been withdrawn. I’m no longer on your back. I have orders from my boss to let you be… (Further confirming the General’s hand in all this)” He however said, this will only come to pass if I stopped writing and pulled down all the stories from the website. In brief, I am under command to buy back my freedom with a staggering cheque worth my two-decade long professional work, the main source of income for my family and fifteen members of staff as well as my legacy!

Your Excellency, for the last decade and half, I have been practicing and horning this skill as a Crime Investigative Journalist and can proudly add, I have never attracted a court case, simply because I only report about facts. It is surprising that other media houses and writers have made similar reports but are free of any intimidation. As I write this, several people who are suspected to be my ‘informers’ from security circles are facing the same threats yet the IGP Gen. Kayihura has not stated for any of our stories to be false. He simply wants us stop writing about the rot in the police, a matter of public interest, a public service. I will not flee my country, for I have no crime committed. I can’t leave my country because I dared to expose the truth.

The purpose of this letter to the Fountain of Honour, and Court of Last Resort is a humble request to protect my practice and my profession within the laws of the country. I yearn to enjoy my gainful and meaningful living, more so in conjunction with Team of Investigators in our profession; and to this end to retain a modicum of credibility in the court of public opinion. If I may end here, I said earlier Your Excellency; I will not flee my country. That means without your positive response, the unintended consequences of the IGP course is being left to the mercy of my oppressor(s), my children and wider family will be the worse without me.

:http://www.theinvestigatornews.com